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1 
THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT: THE 
CHALLENGE OF TITLE IX OBLIGATIONS FOR LAW 
SCHOOL CLINICS 
Ty Alper* 
Abstract: Law faculty who teach and train students in clinical settings regularly expose 
students to the potential for sexual harassment. Because clinics involve actual cases in 
real-world contexts, students may encounter sexual harassment from third parties such as 
clients, witnesses, and judges. Do faculty who tolerate this exposure run afoul of their 
obligations under Title IX to stop and remedy sexual harassment about which they are, or 
should be, aware? 
This Article is the first to identify and propose a method for addressing a phenomenon that 
strikes at the intersection of three sets of priorities for clinical faculty: duty to serve the client, 
duty to educate the student, and duty to protect the student. When a law student may face sexual 
harassment from a third party in the course of representing a client, the values underlying those 
priorities are in tension and admit no obvious solution; some remedies that Title IX arguably 
requires are, in many cases, impossible to square with the duties of loyalty and zealousness 
owed to a clinical client, not to mention the educational goals of the clinic. And yet, clinicians 
can and must embrace the fundamental principle of Title IX, which is to ensure that educational 
opportunities are available to all students, regardless of sex or gender presentation. The 
dilemma explored here echoes the modern American cultural, educational, and legal shift 
toward protecting students from speech and conduct deemed harmful, but does so in a non-
classroom setting where legal ethics and clinical pedagogy are complicating factors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Toward the end of my university-mandated online sexual harassment 
training, at the conclusion of a module called “Protecting Students,” the 
following hypothetical was offered as part of a quiz to assess my 
understanding of my obligations as a faculty member: 
My student Miranda is working on her degree in psychology. As 
part of her practicum, Miranda has to counsel Barry, who has an 
intellectual disability. Recently, she complained to me that Barry 
tries to grab her in their sessions and follows her to her car. I told 
her I can’t help her. She needs to learn how to handle this kind of 
misbehavior on her own.1 
The quiz asked: “Is that an appropriate response?”2 
From among three options, the correct answer was: “No. Miranda is 
experiencing sexual harassment, and it needs to be reported to the Title IX 
Coordinator.”3 The training module goes on to explain: 
Barry’s unwelcome sexual touching is probably illegal sexual 
harassment: The conduct is unwelcome, based on sex, and likely 
sufficiently severe or pervasive. Regardless of what Miranda 
might face professionally, federal law protects her from being 
sexually harassed as a student. So, the school must respond to her 
complaints and take action to stop Barry’s behavior.4 
I chose the correct answer but was unsettled by the implications for 
clinical law faculty. What if Barry had been a client of a law school clinic, 
 
1. Appropriate Responses to Student Complaints about Harassment (graphic), in INTERSECTIONS: 
PREVENTING HARASSMENT & SEXUAL VIOLENCE (EDU-CA), PART II, EVERFI [hereinafter Graphic] 
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one that represented people who were intellectually disabled, indigent, 
and seeking access to education? Would I have had to report him to the 
university’s Title IX office? Would the clinic have had to withdraw from 
his case, even if he had no other reasonable options for high-quality 
representation? How would the school “stop Barry’s behavior”?5 Would 
we have to call the police? 
And what about Miranda? One answer option to the quiz was: “[S]ince 
it’s part of her coursework, Miranda needs to learn how to deal with client 
misbehavior herself.”6 Well, that is obviously wrong and contrary to our 
educational mission. The other answer option was: “[I]n order to protect 
her, the school should immediately drop Miranda from the practicum.”7 
That can’t be right either. Miranda should not be punished for Barry’s 
behavior. What should clinical faculty do, then, if we want to educate the 
student (and not leave her to learn how to deal with client misbehavior by 
herself), ensure that the student is not deprived of an educational 
opportunity (and not just drop her from the class), while at the same time 
fulfilling our ethical obligations of loyalty and zealousness to our client 
(and not reporting him to the authorities)? 
Law school clinics place law students in the role of lawyers, giving 
them as much responsibility as the clinical supervisor believes they can 
handle, usually on behalf of clients who are indigent. They “learn by 
doing,” a hallmark of the clinical enterprise and experiential education in 
general. As one law school’s clinic website advertises: “Clinic students 
represent real clients with real legal problems (not in simulations or 
role-playing exercises).”8 Because they are in the role of lawyers, students 
owe the same duty of zealous representation and loyalty to the clients as 
practicing attorneys.9 Because they are working on real-life cases, they 
are subjected to the same bias and harassment that many practicing 
attorneys experience on a regular basis. 
Consider this hypothetical scenario set in a law school clinic: You teach 
in a criminal defense clinic, and you are supervising a team of two 
 
5. Id.  
6. Id. 
7. Id. 
8. Clinical and Experiential Learning, YALE L. SCH., https://law.yale.edu/studying-law-
yale/clinical-and-experiential-learning [https://perma.cc/SDD2-LVNL]. 
9. See Robert L. Jones, Jr., Gerard F. Glynn & John J. Francis, When Things Go Wrong in the 
Clinic: How to Prevent and Respond to Serious Student Misconduct, 41 U. BALT. L. REV. 441, 442 
n.8 (2012) (“Clinical professors are required by student practice rules to assume responsibility for the 
work of the law students they supervise.”); see also Suellyn Scarnecchia, The Role of Clinical 
Programs in Legal Education, 77 MICH. BAR J. 674, 674 (1998) (explaining that because legal clinics 
allow law students to take on real clients and real cases, the “responsibility of being a lawyer and the 
constant burden of making professional judgments come front and center for the first time”). 
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students, one female and one male,10 who are preparing for the sentencing 
hearing of the client, whom the court appointed the clinic to represent 
because the client is indigent. Now imagine that a key witness for this 
sentencing hearing is the client’s brother, who was a witness to, and victim 
of, much of the physical and emotional abuse to which the client was 
subjected as a child. You and the students believe that the details of your 
client’s traumatic childhood will move the sentencing judge to apply 
leniency. Assume, as is often the case, that drawing out the specific 
information needed for the sentencing presentation requires several hours-
long interviews in the brother’s home. 
After their first visit with the brother, your students report that the 
witness appeared to possess a wealth of helpful information, including 
detailed anecdotes about the abuse he and the client suffered at the hands 
of their parents. He is also willing to sign a release for medical, 
educational, and social services records and has agreed to review the 
records with the students as soon as they are obtained. The students 
assessed him as generally credible and were impressed with his ability to 
remember details that they hoped could be corroborated with 
contemporaneous records. It is clear to them that, in this initial meeting, 
they only scratched the surface of the helpful information they could 
eventually obtain from him. 
The problem? The client’s brother virtually ignored the male student 
during the two-hour long interview and seemed fixated on the female 
student. The male student began the interview by taking the lead with 
questioning, but the witness answered his questions only tersely and 
would then look to the female student as if hoping she would ask the next 
question. Eventually, the female student began to take over the 
questioning, and the witness responded with expansive detail to each of 
her questions. Unfortunately, his responses to her were also peppered with 
sexual comments about her appearance. Both students did their best to 
discourage such comments while in the moment, gently but firmly telling 
the witness that the comments were not appropriate or welcome and that 
they needed to stick to the reason they had come to interview him. These 
efforts fell on deaf ears, and the witness continued to make the comments 
and also to leer suggestively at the female student throughout the 
interview. At one point, the witness motioned to the male student and said 
to the female student: “Next time you come see me, maybe leave him 
at home.” 
Upon their return to the office, the students were pleased to have found 
 
10. Here, and elsewhere when I do not otherwise state, I am referring to cisgender people who 
present as female or present as male. 
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a witness with excellent recall for some of the traumatic experiences that 
will form the backbone of their sentencing presentation. However, they 
were quite unsettled by the witness’s inappropriate and unwelcome sexual 
behavior. It is their judgment that the brother, despite the discomfort he 
caused the students, is nevertheless going to be an important source of 
information for the client’s case and that the female student was able to 
elicit helpful details from him in a way that the other student was unable 
to do. The female student, who aspires to a career as a public defender, 
tells you she is willing to go back and interview the witness, though she 
is not comfortable returning alone. The male student is also willing to go 
back to the witness, although, in his judgment, the female student is much 
more likely to elicit helpful information than he is. 
As the professor overseeing their work, lessons from your university’s 
mandatory sexual harassment training are fresh in your mind.11 That 
training informed you that federal law defines sexual harassment in the 
Title IX context as behavior that is “[u]nwelcome conduct determined by 
a reasonable person to be so severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive 
that it effectively denies a person equal access to the recipient’s education 
program or activity.”12 You are informed that the university sets an even 
lower bar and “includes behavior such as unwelcome sexual advances, 
requests for sexual favors and other conduct of a sexual nature.”13 You are 
 
11. In response to the #MeToo movement, “many public and private employers have sought to 
address and curtail harassment issues through a variety of methods, including examining and revising 
sexual harassment policies and procedures, changing the workplace culture and increasing or 
revamping sexual harassment training.” Miles & Stockbridge P.C., Sexual Harassment Training After 
#MeToo, JD SUPRA (June 25, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/sexual-harassment-
training-after-metoo-20743/ [https://perma.cc/84X4-MVDZ]. For example, California Senate 
Bill 1343 mandated sexual harassment training for most university employees every two years 
starting in 2020. S.B. 1343, 2017–2018 Legis. Sess., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2018). Title IX reporting also 
increased in the wake of #MeToo. See Lena Felton, How Colleges Foretold the #MeToo Movement, 
THE ATL. (Jan. 17, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2018/01/how-colleges-
foretold-the-metoo-movement/550613/ [https://perma.cc/TK4D-QRAP] (describing an increase in 
Title IX reporting on college campuses in the #MeToo era, and a wave of university leaders 
condemning sexual harassment); Jamie D. Halper, In Wake of #MeToo, Harvard Title IX Office Saw 
56 Percent Increase in Disclosures in 2018, Per Annual Report, HARV. CRIMSON (Dec. 14, 2018), 
https://www.thecrimson.com/article/2018/12/14/2018-title-ix-report/ [https://perma.cc/ZCU2-
2AVB]. 
12. See 34 C.F.R. § 106.30(a) (2020). In addition to the language quoted above, recent regulations 
promulgated by the Trump administration set forth two additional types of conduct that would 
constitute “sexual harassment” under Title IX: quid pro quo harassment and sexual assault. 
Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,037 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 
pt. 106). 
13. See FAQ: Understanding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, U.C.: SEXUAL VIOLENCE 
PREVENTION & RESPONSE [hereinafter FAQ: Understanding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault], 
https://sexualviolence.universityofcalifornia.edu/faq/ [https://perma.cc/8VV9-LSQL]. 
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also instructed that “[e]ven when the behavior does not meet the definition 
of illegal sexual harassment or misconduct, reporting the information 
provides an opportunity for early intervention to protect students before 
they are deprived of educational opportunities.”14 You are warned that the 
consequences for faculty who fail to report can be severe.15 
What do you do? Even if you are not sure whether the behavior meets 
the definition of sexual harassment, it was surely unwelcome, of a sexual 
nature, and, at the very least, made the students feel uncomfortable. Your 
Title IX training tells you to report the incident to the university and take 
steps to ensure it does not happen again. Such steps could include 
withdrawing from the case and/or relieving these students from further 
contact with the witness. On the other hand, ethical representation of the 
client, who may not have other access to quality representation, may very 
well demand both the clinic’s continued involvement in the case and 
further meetings with this key witness. Another factor, of course, is the 
students’ views. How much agency should they have? In this example, 
presumably the female student’s voice should be honored; moving her off 
the assignment, against her consent, would be a disservice to her 
educational growth. That said, how do you determine whether a student is 
exercising her will or acquiescing to doing something her professor seems 
to want in order to serve the client in a mission-driven, client-centered 
clinical setting? 
At bottom, how do you balance the goal of training students to become 
zealous, client-centered16 advocates with your obligation to report sexual 
harassment when you are aware that it may have occurred, and is likely to 
occur again, in a school-sponsored course or activity? If it harms the 
client’s interests, are you even permitted to take action when you are 
aware of “third-party” sexual harassment at the hands of a client or 
witness (or judge, or opposing counsel) with whom the student is 
obligated to continue to interact with in order to carry out the aims of the 
representation? Are you permitted not to? How can clinicians turn these 
moments into educational opportunities without endangering 
 
14. See Reporting vs. Investigating (graphic), in INTERSECTIONS: PREVENTING HARASSMENT & 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE (EDU-CA), PART II, EVERFI (displayed as part of a training conducted in 2020) 
(on file with author). 
15. See infra text accompanying note 37. 
16. See Julie D. Lawton, Who Is My Client? Client-Centered Lawyering with Multiple Clients, 22 
CLINICAL L. REV. 145, 147 (2015) (“Client-centered lawyering is based on the idea that clients should 
be the primary decision-maker in determining the direction of their legal case or transaction . . . .”); 
Monroe H. Freedman, Client-Centered Lawyering—What It Isn’t, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 349, 353–54 
(2011) (“Client-centered lawyering is premised on respect for the dignity and autonomy of each 
member of society . . . . [L]awyers act unprofessionally and immorally in preempting or overriding 
their clients’ desires.”). 
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our students? 
Thus arises a special problem in law school clinics that place students 
in the role of professionals, simultaneously exposing them to unwelcome 
sexual behavior and imposing on them a professional, ethical obligation 
to zealously and loyally represent clients who are often indigent and who 
may not have any other access to representation in the legal system. This 
is a problem that sits at the intersection of three sets of priorities in the 
clinical setting: the duty to the client, the duty to educate the student, and 
the duty to protect the student.17 A challenge of the clinical enterprise is 
that the values underlying these priorities are sometimes in tension. This 
Article addresses one such instance, when a reflexive conception of the 
duty to protect the student may ultimately disserve both the student and 
the client. 
In the course of representing clients, lawyers encounter clients or 
witnesses who sexually harass them or subject them to other forms of 
harassment, bias, or intimidation.18 Sometimes the conduct rises to the 
level of legally actionable sexual harassment, requiring intervention, 
remedies, and possible withdrawal from the representation.19 Sometimes, 
 
17. Originally passed to ensure equal educational opportunity for women, Title IX in the sexual 
harassment context explicitly aims to “protect” students. As the U.S. Department of Education’s 
Office of Civil Rights recently explained, 
The new Title IX regulation . . . marks the end of the false dichotomy of either protecting 
survivors, while ignoring due process, or protecting the accused, while disregarding sexual 
misconduct. There is no reason why educators cannot protect all of their students – and under 
this regulation there will be no excuses for failing to do so. 
Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Educ., Secretary DeVos Takes Historic Action to Strengthen Title IX 
Protections for All Students (May 6, 2020), https://www.ed.gov/news/press-releases/secretary-devos-
takes-historic-action-strengthen-title-ix-protections-all-students [https://perma.cc/XU6U-VQJA] 
(quoting Assistant Secretary Kenneth L. Marcus of the U.S. Department of Education, Office for 
Civil Rights). 
18. Although there does not appear to be good data on harassment of attorneys by clients, a number 
of surveys have established that it is a prevalent problem in the profession. See, e.g., Caroline Spiezio, 
Law Firms Failing to Protect Women from Sexual Harassment by Clients, LAW.COM (Dec. 18, 2018, 
12:00 AM), https://www.law.com/international-edition/2018/12/18/harassment-from-clients-can-
stunt-womens-careers-but-few-firms-are-trying-to-stop-it-378-94744/ [https://perma.cc/5727-
6NUA] (“[S]exual harassment by clients is not uncommon in the legal industry, with stories ranging 
from uncomfortable comments to repeated unwanted propositions and even sexual assault.”); Debra 
Cassens Weiss, Bullying and Sexual Harassment ‘Are Rife in the Legal Profession,’ Global Survey 
Finds, A.B.A. J. (May 16, 2019, 7:00 AM), https://www.abajournal.com/news/article/bullying-is-
rife-in-the-legal-profession-while-sexual-harassment-is-common-global-survey-finds 
[https://perma.cc/D5TH-65J6] (reporting that one in three female lawyers have been sexually 
harassed in a work context according to a recently released global survey of nearly 7,000 lawyers in 
135 countries). 
19. See Peter Jan Honigsberg, Marilynn Tham & Gary Alexander, When the Client Harasses the 
Attorney—Recognizing Third-Party Sexual Harassment in the Legal Profession, 28 U. S.F. L. REV. 
715, 737 (1994) (“We need law firms to send out a convincing message that they will effectively 
implement forceful policies against sexual harassment of employees from clients.”).  
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though, including when the kind or scope of the behavior does not rise to 
the level of legally actionable sexual harassment,20 the twin duties of 
zealous representation and confidentiality may actually serve to prohibit 
the lawyers from taking otherwise appropriate or required steps to stop 
and/or report the behavior, lest they violate an ethical responsibility to 
the client. 
The clinical setting adds a layer of further complexity. For one thing, 
universities’ definitions of sexual harassment are often more expansive 
than federal law. For example, the University of Pennsylvania defines 
“sexual harassment,” among other things, as “any unwanted conduct” 
based on sex or gender that “[h]as the purpose or effect of interfering with 
the individual’s academic or work performance” or “[c]reates an 
intimidating or offensive academic, living or work environment.”21 
Moreover, sometimes the behavior to which a student is subjected makes 
the student deeply uncomfortable, even if it does not meet a formal 
definition of harassment.22 
 
20.  To be legally actionable under Title VII, sexual harassment must take the form of either quid 
pro quo harassment or hostile work environment harassment. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e. Quid pro quo sexual 
harassment exists where the perpetrator takes a “tangible” action against the victim as part of the 
harassment. Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). A hostile work environment 
exists where the sexual harassment is “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the 
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.” Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. 
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986). In the Title IX context, one notable change in the definition of sexual 
harassment in the 2020 regulations is that they explicitly exclude hostile work environment from the 
definition of sexual harassment under Title IX. See KRISTEN HARRELL & JESSICA WHITE, ASS’N FOR 
STUDENT CONDUCT ADMIN., TITLE IX OF THE AMENDMENTS OF 1972: 2020 REGULATION 6 
(2020), https://www.theasca.org/files/Publications/WhitePaper-TitleIXRegs2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LA4M-Z3YJ] (“Another important note is that this definition does not include 
reference to prohibitions on creating a hostile environment, which can be found in Title VII 
definitions and in prior guidance from [the Office for Civil Rights].”). 
21. UNIV. OF PA., PENNBOOK 130 (2019–2020), https://catalog.upenn.edu/pdf/2019-20-
pennbook.pdf [https://perma.cc/8C7U-KJKG]; see also YALE UNIV., YALE SEXUAL MISCONDUCT 
POLICIES AND RELATED DEFINITIONS 1 (2020), http://catalog.yale.edu/dus/university-policy-
statements/sexual-misconduct-policies-related-definitions/sexual-misconduct-policies-related-
definitions.pdf [https://perma.cc/25HE-ZYQG] (defining sexual harassment, among other things, as 
“conduct of a sexual nature on or off campus” that “has the purpose or effect of unreasonably 
interfering with an individual’s work or academic performance”). 
22. It is true that there is a growing popular literature about the role of discomfort in personal 
growth. For example, Brené Brown argues that, over the last decade, political, economic, and social 
scarcity has led to a loss of tolerance for discomfort and vulnerability, which she suggests is “where 
the juice happens” in terms of education and growth. See Brené Brown, If You Want Progress Create 
an Uncomfortable Environment, YOUTUBE (May 9, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hm
wMiWRT8z0 [https://perma.cc/QD68-NBUZ]; see also Thomas Oppong, Embrace Discomfort. Your 
Long-Term Personal Growth Depends on It, MEDIUM: THE STARTUP (Dec. 6, 2017), 
https://medium.com/swlh/embrace-discomfort-your-long-term-personal-growth-depends-on-it-
eb5abe5ccd16 [https://perma.cc/D6QS-KP4C] (noting that growth requires discomfort and that to a 
growth-committed person, comfort is just a place to retreat to momentarily while you get ready to 
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In the course of supervising law students, clinical law faculty train 
students how to be lawyers in the real world by placing them in the role 
of attorney, meaning that, like real lawyers, these student-attorneys also 
encounter unwelcome behavior from clients or witnesses (or other third 
parties connected in some way to the representation). The same ethical 
obligations to the client that are present in the non-clinical setting may tie 
the lawyer/supervisor’s hands. However, the consequences of not 
reporting or even stopping the behavior may be quite different, and more 
dire, when a school’s Title IX policies require clinical faculty to shield 
students from sexual harassment and report it so it can be stopped and 
remedied. After all, the mandate of Title IX to protect students (from 
kindergarten through graduate school) is clear: “[The school] is required 
to take corrective actions to stop the harassment, prevent its recurrence, 
and remedy the effects on the student that could reasonably have been 
prevented had the [school] responded promptly and effectively.”23 Of 
course, there is a point at which harassment puts a student at risk and/or 
precludes any meaningful education, and no defensible purpose is served 
by keeping the student in that situation. But there is a lot of grey area 
before that point is reached. 
Consider a few additional possible scenarios facing law students and 
their supervisors in law school clinical programs: 
• A cisgender female clinical student in a prisoners’ rights clinic 
is working on a class-action lawsuit challenging conditions at 
a juvenile justice facility for teenage boys. The case requires 
the student to go on multiple tours of the facility to gather 
evidence, during which each time she is subjected to cat-
calling from several of the incarcerated youth, all of whom are 
the student’s clients. 
• A transgender male24 clinical student in an eviction defense 
clinic is interviewing a witness in the witness’s home. The 
witness possesses critical information necessary to the client’s 
case but is not particularly eager to help. Over the course of an 
hour-long interview, the witness makes a number of 
 
push again). That said, nobody would advocate that law students seek out the discomfort experienced 
as a result of unwelcome sexual conduct. 
23. Amended Letter of Findings from Letisha Morgan, Team Leader, Off. for C.R., U.S. Dep’t of 
Educ., to Dr. Carol L. Folt, C., Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill 4 (June 28, 2018), 
https://www.unc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/FINAL-AMENDED-R-LOF-UNC-Chapel-Hill-
11132051-PDF_Redacted.pdf [https://perma.cc/WG7L-Q7YV]. 
24. Title IX protects transgender students from sex discrimination. See Adams v. Sch. Bd. of St. 
Johns Cnty., 968 F.3d 1286, 1305 (11th Cir. 2020) (“[W]e conclude that Title IX . . . prohibits 
discrimination against a person because he is transgender, because this constitutes discrimination 
based on sex.”). 
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inappropriate comments about the student’s appearance and 
repeatedly asks him to explain his gender. Upon returning to 
the clinical office, it is clear to both the student and his 
supervisor that follow-up interviews of the witness will be 
required in order to zealously represent the client. 
• A cisgender female student in a criminal defense clinic is 
assigned to a case set for trial in front of a notoriously sexist 
male judge, who insists that female attorneys in his courtroom 
wear skirt suits and who tends to respond more favorably to 
female attorneys who wear makeup. 
Federal law requires schools, including law schools, to refrain from 
knowingly putting students in situations in which they are likely to be 
subjected to unwelcome sexual behavior. The federal government has told 
schools that they must “encourage students to report sexual harassment 
early, before such conduct becomes severe or pervasive, so that it can take 
steps to prevent the harassment from creating a hostile environment.”25 
Law schools, as a critical component of their increasingly-recognized duty 
to provide experiential learning opportunities that prepare students to 
enter the legal profession,26 regularly place students in clinical programs 
that expose students to, at least, the risk of such behavior. Is doing so 
consistent with law schools’ Title IX obligations?27 If not, how can we 
effectively train students to navigate challenges they will surely face 
in practice? 
Colleges and universities are taking an increasingly proactive approach 
to address sexual harassment. Although the #MeToo movement put a very 
public spotlight on the problem of pervasive sexual harassment in the 
workplace,28 it was the Obama Administration’s aggressive oversight of 
 
25. See Letter from Anurima Bhargava, Chief, C.R. Div., U.S. Dep’t of Just., & Gary Jackson, 
Reg’l Dir., Off. for C.R., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Royce Engstrom, President, Univ. of Mont., & Lucy 
France, Univ. Couns., Univ. of Mont. 8–9 (May 9, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/ 
files/opa/legacy/2013/05/09/um-ltr-findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/2BS4-LXDN]. 
26. See Ian Holloway & Steven I. Friedland, The Double Life of Law Schools, 68 CASE W. RSRV. 
L. REV. 397, 413 (2017) (explaining that while law schools have long offered clinics and externships, 
this area of learning is expanding, both in terms of students who are given experiential opportunities 
outside of the classroom, and even inside doctrinal courses). 
27. Such programs also expose students to other forms of harassment, such as racial harassment 
and anti-Semitism. This Article is focused primarily on sexual harassment, because it addresses the 
obligations of educational institutions under Title IX. But schools have obligations to protect students 
from other harassment as well, and many of the same considerations apply. Part III, for example, 
discusses the analogy in medical residency programs in which residents are confronted with the 
dilemma of treating racist patients. 
28. See Alix Langone, #MeToo and Time’s Up Founders Explain the Differences Between the 2 
Movements—And How They’re Alike, TIME (Mar. 22, 2018, 5:21 PM), http://time.com/5189945/ 
whats-the-difference-between-the-metoo-and-times-up-movements/ [https://perma.cc/D5Z2-5CGS]. 
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sexual harassment policies and practices in higher education (and some 
K-12 school districts) that appears to have had a lasting effect on the 
responsiveness of colleges and universities to claims of sexual 
harassment.29 The guidance and directives from the Office of Civil Rights 
(OCR) in the Obama Administration’s Department of Education have also 
led colleges and universities to provide greater and more specific guidance 
to students, and mandates to staff and faculty, in terms of reporting 
instances of possible sexual harassment.30 As one commentator explained, 
“While the Supreme Court held that harassment must be ‘severe, 
pervasive, and objectively offensive’ to trigger Title IX, the Obama OCR 
pushed schools to address harassment before it ‘becomes severe or 
pervasive’ in order to prevent the creation of ‘a hostile environment.’”31 
Notably, in 2020, the Trump Administration’s OCR rescinded some of 
the office’s previous directives, including the inclusion of “hostile 
environment” in the definition of sexual harassment.32 It is possible that 
the 2020 revised regulations, as OCR begins to interpreted them in 
practice, will no longer require some of the aggressively proactive 
approaches colleges instituted during the Obama administration. 
However, many colleges and universities are taking no chances and are 
proceeding with overhauls of their policies and practices regarding the 
prevention of and response to instances of sexual harassment.33 According 
 
29. See Sarah Brown, What Does the End of Obama’s Title IX Guidance Mean for Colleges?, 
CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 22, 2017), https://www.chronicle.com/article/What-Does-the-End-
of-Obama-s/241281 [https://perma.cc/S4KE-MPLE] (noting that guidance from the Obama 
administration “made clear that the federal government would aggressively police [colleges’ 
obligation to respond promptly and equitably to reports of sexual violence], and marked a new era of 
strict enforcement”). 
30. See Brittany K. Bull, Raped Abroad: Extraterritorial Application of Title IX for American 
University Students Sexually Assaulted While Studying Abroad, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 439, 447 (2017) 
(“OCR possesses the primary responsibility for Title IX enforcement.”). For example, at UC 
Berkeley, where I teach, the University reached a settlement in 2018 with OCR that was designed to 
remedy past violations of Title IX. Sakura Cannestra, 4-Year Federal Investigation Finds that UC 
Berkeley Violated Title IX Policies, Offers Recommendations, DAILY CALIFORNIAN (Feb. 28, 2018), 
http://www.dailycal.org/2018/02/28/4-years-later-federal-investigation-uc-berkeleys-alleged-
mishandling-sexual-misconduct-cases-ends-recommendations/ [https://perma.cc/9XG9-XE4W]; 
Berkeley Compliance Response, U.C. BERKELEY, http://complianceresponse.berkeley.edu/ 
[https://perma.cc/LZ89-PB7G]. 
31. R. Shep Melnick, Analyzing the Department of Education’s Final Title IX Rules on Sexual 
Misconduct, BROOKINGS INST. (June 11, 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/analyzing-the-
department-of-educations-final-title-ix-rules-on-sexual-misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/75J9-NS2Y]. 
32. See HARRELL & WHITE, supra note 20, at 6; Melnick, supra note 31.  
33. Melnick, supra note 31 (“The most immediate question is how colleges and universities will 
respond to the new rules. Despite the fact that many schools initially opposed the Obama-era policies, 
few are eager to go through another round of revision.”); see also Robin Wilson, Trump 
Administration May Back Away from Title IX, But Campuses Won’t, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 
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to one account, “[c]ampus Title IX officers [report that they] remain 
committed to sexual-assault prevention and response,” despite the Trump 
administration’s somewhat more relaxed approach.34 This may be in part 
because they believe they have settled on best practices and in part 
because they know that regulations can change with a 
new administration.35 
In any event, faculty members and college administrators generally 
know by now that they cannot knowingly place students in positions 
where they are likely to be sexually harassed, and they must report 
instances of sexual harassment to the school’s “Title IX Office” as soon 
as they learn of them. Failure to do so may result in forced remedial 
measures, loss of federal funding, and/or steep financial settlements with 
aggrieved students.36 Individual faculty members who fail in their 
reporting duties face serious consequences, including termination.37 
Faculty obligations are also relatively clear when it comes to most 
forms of what is called “third-party” harassment. For example, if a school 
sends a student to an internship and the student is sexually harassed by her 
internship supervisor, the school is liable if it “knows or should know” of 
the harassment.38 Likewise, if a school contracts with someone to provide 
 
11, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Trump-Administration-May-Back/238382 
[https://perma.cc/6V82-43R3]; Emily Yoffe, The Uncomfortable Truth About Campus Rape Policy, 
THE ATL. (Sept. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/archive/2017/09/the-
uncomfortable-truth-about-campus-rape-policy/538974/ [https://perma.cc/9B3V-3K8R].  
34. Brown, supra note 29. 
35. See Melnick, supra note 31 (“[I]f Joe Biden is elected president in November, his 
administration will undoubtedly seek to change many parts of these regulations.”). 
36. See Sara Lipka, How 46 Title IX Cases Were Resolved, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. 
(Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.chronicle.com/article/How-46-Title-IX-Cases-Were/234912 
[https://perma.cc/U373-VKYT]; Anita Wadhwani, Settling Sex Assault Lawsuits Costs Universities 
Millions, TENNESSEAN (July 6, 2016, 4:32 PM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/2016/07/0
6/settling-sex-assault-lawsuits-costs-universities-millions/86756078/ [https://perma.cc/S6ZL-
GF6V]; Karen M. Tani, An Administrative Right to Be Free from Sexual Violence? Title IX 
Enforcement in Historical and Institutional Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1847, 1851 (2017) (noting that 
violations of Title IX may “trigger[] a loss of federal funds”). 
37. See Letter from Kathleen Salvaty, Systemwide Title IX Coordinator, Systemwide Title IX Off., 
U.C., to U.C. Cs. (Apr. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Letter from Kathleen Salvaty] (on file with author). It is 
just as clear that an educational institution is not liable if no official in the institution had knowledge 
of the discrimination—or the likelihood of discrimination—and failed to act. See Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 277 (1998) (finding that damages cannot be recovered under 
Title IX for a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student unless a school district official has actual notice 
of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher’s misconduct). 
38. See OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: 
HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 12 
(2001) [hereinafter REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE], https://www2.ed.gov/about/ 
offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8VL-LDLL] (formally rescinded); Cynthia 
Grant Bowman & MaryBeth Lipp, Legal Limbo of the Student Intern: The Responsibility of Colleges 
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some kind of service or experience to students, those contracted parties 
are treated as employees for Title IX purposes, and the school may be 
liable if it knew or should have known about the contractor sexually 
harassing a student.39 These rules make sense and provide incentives for 
educational institutions to take proactive steps to ensure that their students 
do not experience sexual harassment in school-related courses 
or activities.40 
But when the harassing third parties are clients, key witnesses, or 
presiding judges, the traditional proactive steps that Title IX arguably 
demands may very likely harm the client’s interests. Clinics place students 
in role as practicing attorneys, requiring them—to effectively represent 
the client—to talk and interact with a wide range of people, some of whom 
act inappropriately. Often, it is not an ethically-acceptable option to avoid 
talking to a particular person. Practicing attorneys face these challenges 
every day, and a law school program that allows students to practice as 
attorneys means that the students will face them too. In the context of 
mission-driven, public interest law school clinics, they are also often 
representing clients who are indigent and have no other options for legal 
representation.41 After all, “[c]linical legal education has been focusing on 
legal services for the underserved and on the justice mission of law 
schools for years.”42 
But that does mean law schools knowingly send students into 
situations—for academic credit—in which they may be sexually harassed. 
Sometimes, faculty know the students will likely be sexually harassed or 
at least face unwelcome behavior that causes great discomfort. Other 
times, faculty find out after the fact, but professional obligations to clients 
renders reporting the behavior as they “should” fraught with ethical, legal, 
and moral complications. 
 
and Universities to Protect Student Interns Against Sexual Harassment, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 95, 
113–114 (2000) (arguing that colleges could be liable for damages under Title IX if a student 
experiences sexual harassment during her off-campus internship).  
39. UNIV. OF CAL.: SYSTEMWIDE TITLE IX OFF., SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
8 (2019), https://sa.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/RevisedSVSHPolicy.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/6GRU-4Y25].  
40. These rules are also similar to an employer’s obligations under Title VII to remedy instances 
of actionable sexual harassment it knows or should have known about. See Honigsberg et al., supra 
note 19. 
41. Law school clinical programs have long served to address unmet legal needs. Jon C. Dubin, 
Clinical Design for Social Justice Imperatives, 51 SMU L. REV. 1461, 1475, 1505 (1998); see also 
Douglas A. Blaze, Déjà Vu All over Again: Reflections on Fifty Years of Clinical Education, 64 TENN. 
L. REV. 939, 950 (1997) (“[T]he earliest clinical programs were an outgrowth of the legal aid 
movement.”). 
42. Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law School Clinics in 
Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 997 (2004). 
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This issue arises in many other experiential education contexts, 
including in other fields such as journalism, social work, and medicine. 
This Article focuses on law school clinics, in which faculty and school 
administrators place law students, in order to conduct their work on behalf 
of clients, in situations that they are aware may expose the students to 
harassing conduct. The Article proceeds in three parts. 
Part One provides an overview of the obligations Title IX appears to 
impose on educational institutions to prevent exposure to sexual 
harassment, particularly as it relates to harassment by “third parties.” 
Part Two first describes how law school clinics at times place students 
in situations that may very well expose them to sexual harassment. It then 
explores the ways in which the standard template for addressing sexual 
harassment concerns under Title IX—prevent it when possible, and 
remedy when it occurs—does not neatly fit in the clinical context. This 
Part discusses the ethical concerns when the problematic behavior 
involves a client to whom the clinic owes a duty of confidentiality and 
loyalty, as well as when it involves a witness or other relevant player in 
the case whose cooperation or information is confidential and integral to 
the client’s case. It also discusses why some of the possible solutions—
such as assigning certain roles to certain students in order to minimize 
exposure to harassment—are likely to disproportionately disadvantage 
and limit the educational opportunities for female students, non-binary 
students, and transgender students. Such a remedy may itself run afoul of 
Title IX. 
Part Three offers suggestions for addressing this challenge, presenting 
two kinds of approaches. First, we must take seriously Title IX’s focus on 
the denial of educational opportunities, as well as the Supreme Court’s 
direction to consider the context of the educational setting in which the 
harassment occurs. Harassment by a witness in the clinical law school 
setting is as different from harassment by an internship supervisor as a 
hug from a kindergarten teacher is different from a hug from a high school 
teacher. Context matters, and it should guide the faculty member’s 
interpretation of what is mandatory to report under Title IX. Second, apart 
from formal reporting requirements, clinical faculty should use such 
situations as opportunities to teach students about the constraints that duty 
to a client places on them. Clinicians should not necessarily report 
harassment to the police or campus authorities (and in many situations, 
their ethical obligations to the clients prohibits them from doing so), but 
neither should they ignore it or fail to address it. Instead, they should 
protect the student to the greatest extent possible while providing options 
that account for the students’ preferences, and they should explicitly teach 
students how to address harassment they may experience as a practicing 
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attorney. To help navigate these complex interests, this Part introduces a 
matrix of variables that can serve as a starting point for assessing the 
appropriate response in a given situation. 
The Conclusion notes how this conundrum may arise in other contexts 
and generate further topics for discussion. The duty to the client 
sometimes precludes the remedies that a university may impose under the 
purported mandate of Title IX. Placing students in the role of attorneys 
means teaching them how to navigate a world in which their interests may 
be subsumed in favor of their obligation to clients. Law school faculty, 
especially clinical faculty, should not shield students from what they are 
going to face as lawyers—but we must support students and provide space 
for them to learn and grow as professionals. Our role is to expose them to 
what they will face as lawyers and teach them how to navigate and thrive 
in the profession. In this way, my argument is in conversation with a larger 
literature about the obligation of universities to create “safe spaces” for 
students,43 but in the very different non-classroom context of a law school 
clinic serving clients who are indigent, in which legal ethics and clinical 
pedagogy inject significant complexity. Although it does not directly take 
sides in that debate, it does challenge the assumption that the duty to 
protect the student is the value that, in all instances, rises above the duties 
to educate the student and serve the client. 
I. THIRD-PARTY SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF CLINICAL LAW 
STUDENTS 
In role as aspiring professionals, clinical law students, depending on 
the particular setting, interact with a wide range of third parties whom the 
university does not control: clients, witnesses, opposing counsel, judges, 
consulting attorneys, court clerks, and even bystanders or other people 
without a direct connection to a clinic case (but whom the students may 
have to face repeatedly). Any of these third parties may sexually harass a 
clinical law student, raising the question of how the law addresses 
harassment by someone other than a fellow student or a direct supervisor. 
This Part reviews that law, revealing a dearth of both precedent 
 
43. See, e.g., Michael S. Roth, Opinion, Don’t Dismiss ‘Safe Spaces’, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/29/opinion/safe-spaces-campus.html 
[https://perma.cc/W7JG-4N42] (“Calling for such spaces is to call for schools to promote a basic 
sense of inclusion and respect that enables all students to thrive—to be open to ideas and perspectives 
so that the differences they encounter are educative and not destructive.”); Jonathan Zimmerman, 
College Campuses Should Not Be Safe Spaces, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC. (Jan. 17, 
2019), https://www.chronicle.com/article/College-Campuses-Should-Not-Be/245505 
[https://perma.cc/MQ63-XRGC] (arguing that “the safe-space doctrine . . . creates huge barriers to 
dialogue, by declaring any discomfort as out of bounds”).  
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and commentary. 
A. Third-Party Sexual Harassment Under Title VII 
Before turning to liability for third-party harassment under Title IX, it 
is worth briefly reviewing the general rule that employers can be held 
liable for the actions of third parties, including customers, patients, and 
people who are incarcerated. While Title VII law is not currently directly 
applicable to the Title IX setting,44 the doctrine’s allowance for more 
relaxed rules in certain employment contexts is instructive for the clinical 
setting discussed in the next Part. 
Although employers are not expected to eradicate harassment by 
parties over whom they do not have direct control, they must take 
immediate, corrective actions when they know—or should know—of the 
conduct. For example, in Folkerson v. Circus Circus Enterprises, Inc.,45 
the Ninth Circuit held that “an employer may be held liable for sexual 
harassment on the part of a private individual . . . where the employer 
either ratifies or acquiesces in the harassment by not taking immediate 
and/or corrective actions when it knew or should have known of the 
conduct.”46 Similarly, in Lockard v. Pizza Hut, Inc.,47 the Tenth Circuit 
found that “harassing conduct by . . . two male customers was sufficiently 
severe to create an abusive environment.”48 That court found that “the 
same standard of liability applies to both co-worker and customer 
harassment.”49 This means that “employers may be held liable in these 
circumstances if they fail to remedy or prevent a hostile or offensive work 
environment of which management-level employees knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known.”50 
This general rule is applicable even in situations where employees 
assume some risk given the nature of the work. For example, in Crist v. 
Focus Homes, Inc.,51 the Eighth Circuit found that “a residential program 
 
44. The Trump administration recently made clear its view that Title VII was no longer an 
appropriate touchstone for a Title IX analysis: “The Department does not wish to apply the same 
definition of actionable sexual harassment under Title VII to Title IX because such an application 
would equate workplaces with educational environments . . . .” Nondiscrimination on the Basis of 
Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 
30,037 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 106).  
45. 107 F.3d 754 (9th Cir. 1997). 
46. Id. at 756. 
47. 162 F.3d 1062 (10th Cir. 1998). 
48. Id. at 1072. 
49. Id. at 1074. 
50. Id.  
51. 122 F.3d 1107 (8th Cir. 1997). 
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for developmentally disabled individuals [can] be found liable [under 
Title VII] for sexual harassment due to its failure to respond appropriately 
to the conduct of a mentally incapacitated resident toward program 
employees.”52 In that case, the resident was significantly developmentally 
disabled and had both physically and sexually assaulted various staff 
members.53 The court recognized that the defendant had a very limited 
ability to control the actions of the resident at issue, but that it “clearly 
controlled the environment . . . and it had the ability to alter those 
conditions to a substantial degree.”54 Thus, it still had a responsibility to 
implement corrective measures where feasible.55 
Similarly, in Turnbull v. Topeka State Hospital,56 the Tenth Circuit 
found that a mental hospital could be held liable under Title VII after a 
patient violently sexually assaulted a female doctor.57 As in Crist, the 
court noted that it is the employers’ ability to control the environment—
not the third party—that matters to a Title VII analysis in this context. The 
Turnbull court explained: 
It is not always possible for an employer to completely eliminate 
offensive behavior, and thus the effectiveness inquiry looks not 
to whether offensive behavior actually ceased but to whether the 
remedial and preventative action was reasonably calculated to end 
the harassment. We also consider the appellants’ expectations 
given their choice of employment. In an environment like [a state 
mental hospital] it would be impossible to eliminate all potential 
risk; instead, we ask whether the hospital took reasonable 
measures to alleviate known or obvious risks.58 
Case law in the prison setting tends to follow the same guidelines. In 
Freitag v. Ayers,59 the Ninth Circuit found that a state department of 
correction can “be held liable for prison officials’ failure to correct a 
hostile work environment that is the result of male prisoners’ sexual 
harassment of female guards.”60 It explained that prisons are not exempt 
from Title VII and that “[n]othing in the law suggests that prison officials 
may ignore sexually hostile conduct and refrain from taking corrective 
actions that would safeguard the rights of the victims, whether they be 
 
52. Id. at 1108. 
53. Id. 
54. Id. at 1111–12. 
55. Id. 
56. 255 F.3d 1238 (10th Cir. 2001). 
57. Id. at 1245  
58. Id. at 1245 (citation omitted). 
59. 468 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2006). 
60. Id. at 532. 
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guards or inmates.”61 
Title VII thus establishes a baseline for the responsibility of employers 
to protect employees from third-party harassment of which they are, or 
should be, aware, and provides a useful, if not legally binding, analogy to 
the clinical law context. What the typical Title VII context does not 
account for, however, is the added protections that exist in the educational 
setting, and the ethical duties of attorneys in a law school clinic serving 
clients who are indigent—both of which complicate the responsibilities of 
the clinical supervisor who is, or should be, aware of third-party 
harassment of a clinical law student. 
B. Third-Party Sexual Harassment Under Title IX 
Title IX prohibits sex discrimination in any educational setting that 
receives federal funding.62 Specifically, Title IX provides that “[n]o 
person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from 
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal 
financial assistance.”63 The Education Amendments of 1972 define 
“program or activity” to include “all of the operations” of private or public 
postsecondary institutions that receive federal funds.64 Thus, Title IX 
applies to virtually all colleges and universities in the United States. Over 
the years, Title IX expanded to cover sexual harassment, ultimately 
protecting students from experiencing harassment in school settings. In 
Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools,65 the Supreme Court 
explicitly included sexual harassment as one of the forms of sex 
discrimination prohibited by Title IX.66 
Supreme Court case law has eroded some of the potential teeth of 
Title IX. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District,67 the 
Supreme Court considered an educational institution’s liability for money 
damages for a faculty member’s harassment of a student. The Supreme 
Court rejected the student’s claim and concluded that the school district 
was not liable for damages because it neither had actual notice of the 
harassment nor could it be said to have been deliberately indifferent to 
 
61. Id. at 539. 
62. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 38, at 2. 
63. 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). 
64. Id. § 1687. 
65. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). 
66. Id. at 75.  
67. 524 U.S. 274 (1998). 
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it.68 The Court held that 
students may not recover damages from a school district under 
Title IX for teacher-student sexual harassment “unless an official 
[of the district] who at a minimum has authority to address the 
alleged discrimination and to institute corrective measures on the 
[district’s] behalf has actual knowledge of discrimination . . . and 
fails adequately to respond.”69 
In other words, the university’s response must amount to “deliberate 
indifference to discrimination.”70 And in Davis v. Monroe County Board 
of Education,71 the Supreme Court addressed an educational institution’s 
liability for peer sexual harassment and essentially extended Gebser’s 
holding to the peer-to-peer situation.72 
As Karen Tani has observed, 
[t]aken together, these cases suggested that women in educational 
settings did have a right to be free from sexual imposition, but 
also that colleges and universities had little to fear if they failed 
to take that right seriously. Indeed, the cases arguably 
incentivized institutions to “bury their heads in the sand” rather 
than actively prevent rights violations, lest they accrue the kind 
of knowledge that might trigger liability.73 
As Tani explains, the Supreme Court’s failure to embrace the promise 
of Title IX and the Violence Against Women Act74 caused people 
concerned with sexual harassment and violence in educational settings to 
shift their attention to the Department of Education’s Office of Civil 
Rights (OCR), which can investigate and issue mandates, usually in the 
form of a stipulated resolution.75 In its 2001 guidance,76 OCR reminded 
recipients of federal aid that Gebser and Davis established the standards 
for private actions for money damages; administrative enforcement of 
 
68. Id. at 277.  
69. William A. Kaplin, A Typology and Critique of Title IX Sexual Harassment Law After Gebser 
and Davis, 26 J. COLL. & UNIV. L. 615, 620 (2000) (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290).  
70. Id. at 620 (citing Gebser, 524 U.S. at 290–91). 
71. 526 U.S. 629 (1999). 
72. Id. at 653–54. In Davis, the Supreme Court remanded the student’s claim to the district court 
for trial, holding that the allegations, if proven, would subject the school district to money damages 
liability. Id. The Court’s holding paralleled the “actual notice and deliberate indifference standard” 
used under Gebser. Kaplin, supra note 69, at 625 (citing Davis, 526 U.S. at 643).  
73. Tani, supra note 36, at 1861–62.  
74. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 602 (2000) (holding that Congress did not have 
Constitutional authority to enact a federal civil remedy under the Violence Against Women Act for 
victims of gender-related violence); Tani, supra note 36, at 1862. 
75. Tani, supra note 36, at 1863. 
76. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 38. 
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Title IX could, and does, rely on a broader set of standards that hold 
schools to account on the basis of “potential Title IX violations” that 
might not meet the Supreme Court’s test for monetary liability.77 
Indeed, guidance materials from the U.S. Department of Education 
clearly delineate schools’ obligations both before and after a complaint of 
sexual misconduct is made by a student.78 Where the school is on “notice” 
of possible sexual harassment of students, the school must take steps to 
understand what occurred and to respond appropriately.79 They have to 
stop the behavior and remedy the harm to the student. Ultimately, these 
steps must constitute a “reasonable response,” evaluated under the 
circumstances.80 The school also must adopt and publish grievance 
procedures that provide for a prompt and equitable resolution of 
complaints of sex discrimination, including sexual misconduct.81 
The OCR guidelines concerning “[e]ducation programs or activities” 
covered by Title IX refer to “any academic, extracurricular, research, 
occupational training, or other education program or activity operated by 
a recipient.”82 Thus, the agency guidelines also outline universities’ 
obligations in programs not wholly operated by the school, such as when 
a student must interact with outside organizations or clients as part of an 
education program or activity. According to these guidelines, schools 
facilitating educational programs not operated by the school must develop 
procedures to ensure that the actual operators of the program do not 
subject students to prohibited behavior.83 
 
77. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,037 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 
pt. 106). 
78. Id. at 30,041. 
79. Id.  
80. Id. at 30,029. Schools are expected to take tailored steps that, among other factors, take into 
account “the nature of the allegations, the source of the complaint, the age of the student or students 
involved, the size and administrative structure of the school.” Id. at 30,047 (quoting OFF. FOR C.R., 
U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE: HARASSMENT OF STUDENTS BY 
SCHOOL EMPLOYEES, OTHER STUDENTS, OR THIRD PARTIES 15 (2001), https://www2.ed.gov/ 
about/offices/list/ocr/docs/shguide.pdf [https://perma.cc/D8VL-LDLL]). 
81. Id. at 30,054. 
82. 34 C.F.R. § 106.31(a) (2020). 
83. Id. § 106.31(d)(1)–(2). OCR has recently enforced these very guidelines regarding third-party 
harassment at my university, UC Berkeley. One of its findings was that UC Berkeley had failed to 
make it clear in its Sexual Violence and Sexual Harassment policies that “its coverage applies to 
complaints of sexual harassment and sexual violence against third parties, such as individuals in the 
University community whose conduct may create a hostile environment for students, faculty, or staff 
in the University’s programs or activities.” Letter from Laura Faer, Reg’l Dir., Region IX, Off. for 
C.R., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., to Carol T. Christ, C., U.C. Berkeley 10 
(Feb. 26, 2018), https://complianceresponse.berkeley.edu/pdf/09142232ltr.pdf 
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While the OCR notes that third parties cannot be said to engage in quid 
pro quo harassment (that is, where a teacher or employee “conditions an 
educational decision or benefit on the student’s submission to unwelcome 
sexual conduct”) because they do not have direct responsibility over other 
students, any unwelcome sexual conduct on their part is evaluated under 
a hostile environment framework.84 
Within this framework, schools are responsible for taking action in 
response to a third party’s inappropriate conduct if it “knows or should 
know” of the harassment.85 The guidelines put forth a “totality of the 
circumstances” test, whereby the harassing conduct’s limiting impact on 
a student’s educational experience is determined by: (1) the degree to 
which the conduct affected one or more students’ education; (2) the type, 
frequency, and duration of the conduct; (3) the identity of and relationship 
between the alleged harasser and the subject(s) of the harassment; (4) the 
number of individuals involved; (5) the age and sex of the alleged harasser 
and the subject(s) of the harassment; (6) the size of the school, location of 
the incidents, and context in which they occurred; (7) other incidents at 
the school; and (8) other incidents of gender-based, but 
nonsexual harassment.86 
In sum, schools’ responsibilities under Title IX regarding third parties 
and employees work to ensure that students’ educational experiences are 
not impeded by sexual harassment or the threat of sexual harassment by 
anyone over whom the school has a certain degree of (but not direct) 
control. Moreover, law school clinics are not exempt from these rules. 
Indeed, because they provide “occupational training,” and they also fall 
under the guidance’s definition of either “third parties” or “employees,” 
they are unmistakably subject to the guidance and to Title IX’s clear 
requirements regarding “third party” and employee harassment.87 
 
[https://perma.cc/S9K8-6QT4] (documenting a summary of her Title IX investigations for case 
numbers 09-14-2232, 09-15-2392, and 09-16-2399).  
84. OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC., SEXUAL HARASSMENT: IT’S NOT ACADEMIC 5 (2008), 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/ocrshpam.pdf [https://perma.cc/J9DX-8K8L]; 
REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 38, at 2, 5. 
85. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 38, at 12. 
86. For example, in EEOC v. National Education Ass’n the court found that a male supervisor’s 
“rude, overbearing, obnoxious, loud, vulgar, and generally unpleasant” comments and physically 
aggressive (but non-sexual) actions toward female subordinate employees may constitute sexual 
harassment if the supervisor’s male subordinates were treated differently. 422 F.3d 840, 845 (9th 
Cir. 2005); see also REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 38, at 10–12. 
87. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 38, at 12–13.  
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C. Existing Literature and Case Law on Third-Party Harassment 
There is some literature on harassment of students engaged in programs 
not wholly operated by the school, such as when a student must interact 
with outside organizations or clients as part of an education program or 
activity. However, this literature focuses on student-to-student harassment 
or on supervisor-to-student harassment. In such cases, there is no need to 
balance the duty to protect the student from harassment with the 
obligations inherent in the professional representation of a client. Thus, 
the existing literature leaves a gap in understanding schools’ 
responsibilities in the case of harassment by clients or witnesses or other 
players involved in the substantive work of an internship or other external 
educational experience.88 
For example, in their 2000 article, Cynthia Grant Bowman and 
MaryBeth Lipp address the issue of Title IX in the context of university 
internships.89 Specifically, the article asks what steps a university should 
take to protect the students it has placed in internships from sexual 
harassment (and what it should do to protect itself from potential 
liability).90 In the course of examining the issue, the authors describe a 
number of different internship arrangements that result in different levels 
of Title IX protections for students who are harassed by faculty or 
 
88. There is also some legal precedent in the medical context regarding harassment of interns by 
supervisors. In Doe v. Mercy Catholic Medical Center, Doe, a radiology resident at Mercy Catholic 
Center, alleged that (1) the director of the residency program at the Center sexually harassed her; and 
(2) she was later dismissed from the residency program after she complained about his conduct. 850 
F.3d 545 (3d Cir. 2017). Doe brought suit for sexual harassment and retaliation under Title IX. Id. at 
549. The Third Circuit held that the discrimination and harassment prohibitions of Title IX apply to 
a private hospital’s medical residency program. Id. at 545. In O’Connor v. Davis, O’Connor, a college 
student, sued the state and the hospital in which she was a volunteer intern through her school, 
claiming that a doctor subjected her to sexual harassment in violation of Title VII and Title IX. 126 
F.3d 112 (2d Cir. 1997). The Second Circuit affirmed the District Court and held that: (1) O’Connor 
was not an employee under Title VII, and (2) the hospital was not transformed into an administrator 
of an education program or activity under Title IX by permitting the student to perform volunteer 
field work at its facility. Id. at 116, 119. As such, O’Connor did not have a remedy under Title VII or 
Title IX. Id. at 118–19. The Court nevertheless noted that it was not “unsympathetic to O’Connor’s 
situation.” Id. at 119. It stated 
We recognize, for example, that from her perspective, her success at Marymount was dependent 
to some degree on successfully completing her internship with Rockland, and that her 
dependency on Rockland made her vulnerable to continued harassment much as an employee 
dependent on a regular wage can be vulnerable to ongoing misconduct. In a similar vein, we 
recognize that O’Connor was not in quite the same position to simply walk away from the alleged 
harassment as are many other volunteers. 
Id. Note, however, that neither of these cases involve the more complicated scenario of a medical 
intern who is harassed by a patient. 
89. Bowman & Lipp, supra note 38, at 96–97. 
90. Id. at 128. 
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employers in an internship setting.91 Bowman and Lipp make a 
compelling case that workplace sexual harassment in the university 
internship setting is both pervasive and highly destructive, and the effects 
are disproportionately borne by women.92 But the article does not touch 
on harassment by clients or other non-supervisors in internship, field 
placement, or clinical settings. 
David Yamada’s 2002 article focuses on the legal and policy 
implications of student internships with regards to employment rights.93 
The article concludes that student interns have fallen into “a legal 
void . . . between the cracks of legal protections for workers and legal 
protections for students,” i.e., between Title VII and Title IX 
protections.94 Yamada suggests that a legislative amendment explicitly 
covering interns would remedy this void and protect them from 
discrimination and sexual harassment.95 
Nancy Maurer’s and Robert Seibel’s 2010 article focuses on a slightly 
different issue relating to faculty members’ responsibilities and 
obligations in the context of field placements.96 The article examines the 
ways in which faculty members can identify, address, and remedy the 
power issues that arise in these placements.97 While the authors highlight 
the supervisor/supervisee relationship, the article’s recommendations 
could hypothetically be applied more largely to faculty members’ 
responsibilities under Title IX in the context of law school clinics. For 
example, the article sets out various ways of addressing power dynamics 
including “program planning and materials, meetings, orientations, 
classes, shared experiences, and targeted training.”98 But the authors do 
not specifically address problematic dynamics between students 
and non-supervisors. 
William Kaplin’s 2000 article considers various types of conceivable 
claims post-Gebser and post-Davis.99 Notably, the article poses the 
following hypothetical: 
A student sues an educational institution for acts of a third party 
 
91. Id. at 105–11. 
92. Id. at 96. 
93. David C. Yamada, The Employment Law Rights of Student Interns, 35 CONN. L. REV. 215, 
216 (2002). 
94. Id. at 217. 
95. Id. at 256–57. 
96. Nancy M. Maurer & Robert F. Seibel, Addressing Problems of Power and Supervision in Field 
Placements, 17 CLINICAL L. REV. 145, 146–48 (2010). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 166–87.  
99. Kaplin, supra note 69, at 640–42. 
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who has allegedly harassed the student. The third party might be 
a staff member at a clinical or field placement, a student from 
another school who is in an externship program with the alleged 
victim, a patient in a clinic to which the student is assigned, a 
visitor to the campus, or even a stranger who comes onto 
the campus.100 
The article suggests that, under Gebser and Davis, the court would 
assess the school’s liability by determining what type of relationship 
exists between the school and the alleged harasser.101 By re-characterizing 
the harasser’s relationship to the school as that of either a teacher’s to the 
school or a student’s to the school, the harasser’s conduct can more neatly 
fall within the Supreme Court’s established frameworks.102 But the article 
does not address the obligations of faculty with respect to preventing or 
remedying harassment by third parties where there might be an 
independent ethical obligation (say, of loyalty or zealous representation) 
that is owed to the harasser, or to a client whose case is in some way 
dependent on the participation of the harasser (as in the example with 
which this Article begins). 
Finally, Brittany Bull’s 2017 article raises the issue of whether Title IX 
applies extraterritorially to allegations of sex discrimination occurring 
abroad.103 While this question is not directly on point, the author 
concludes that courts are not likely to find extraterritorial jurisdiction 
under Title IX, and suggests instead that “universities should proactively 
implement and publicize preventative programming and responsive 
services for students studying abroad.”104 Bull’s recommendations 
parallel potentially relevant suggestions in the realm of law school clinics 
(e.g., increasing transparency regarding the safety of individual programs 
and/or requiring universities to institute comprehensive mandatory 
pre-departure orientations) that Part III discusses.105 
Section I.A describes the state of the law with respect to Title VII 
liability for employers whose employees experience harassment at the 
hands of third parties. But there is no case law addressing federal liability 
of law schools in the context of student harassment by third parties in a 
law school clinic.106 
 
100. Id. at 633–34.  
101. Id. at 634. 
102. Id. 
103. Bull, supra note 30, at 456–69. 
104. Id. at 481–82.  
105. Id. at 476, 481.  
106. In the wake of Gebser and Davis, some courts have made it difficult for students to obtain 
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Scholars have explored the application of Title IX to “third parties” in 
various contexts: study-abroad programs, student internships, field 
placements, and even medical school clinics. These relatively new 
applications undoubtedly raise relevant questions and recommendations 
in the context of clinical education in law schools. However, neither the 
existing literature nor the case law have yet to specifically suggest the 
extent of a school’s responsibilities in the case of third-party sexual 
harassment of students participating in a law school’s clinical program. 
II. THE CONUNDRUM OF LAW SCHOOL CLINICS: WHY 
TRADITIONAL TITLE IX REMEDIES ARE NOT 
ALWAYS FEASIBLE 
As a professor at a university that receives federal funding, my 
reporting obligations under Title IX appear to be unequivocal. In 2017, 
the Systemwide Title IX Coordinator for the University of California 
wrote an open letter to the system’s chancellors, asking them to share with 
their respective campuses a reminder that “[a]ll employees . . . must 
inform the Title IX officer when, in the course of their work, they become 
aware that a student has experienced sexual harassment or sexual 
violence.”107 Faculty members “have a broader obligation”; they “must 
inform the Title IX officer when they get a report of sexual harassment or 
sexual violence from a colleague, a subordinate or anyone else affiliated 
 
relief under Title IX, making the prerequisite that an institution have notice of any misconduct before 
it can be held liable exceedingly stringent. See Mattingly v. Univ. of Louisville, No. 3:05CV-393-H, 
2006 WL 2178032, at *1 (W.D. Ky. July 28, 2006). Mattingly confronted whether a student studying 
abroad at the University of Portugal had a private remedy under Title IX against her home university 
in Louisville after she was raped abroad. Id. The court concluded that the University of Louisville 
could not be liable for monetary damages under Title IX because it did not receive actual notice of 
the harassment nor did it respond to it with “deliberate indifference.” Id. at *4 (citing Gebser v. Lago 
Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 524 U.S. 274, 292–93 (1998)). Similarly, students in the medical field have 
found it difficult to establish that their schools were sufficiently notified of a third party’s misconduct 
in order to obtain any relief under Title IX. The Second Circuit, for example, held that the dental 
school at New York University (NYU) could not be held liable under Title IX for discriminatory 
sexual harassment of a dental student by her clinical patient because neither her supervisors nor NYU 
were on notice of the sexual harassment. Murray v. N.Y. Univ. Coll. of Dentistry, 57 F.3d 243, 249–
51 (2d Cir. 1995). Similarly, the Ninth Circuit recently found that the University of California could 
not be held liable under Title IX for ending an investigation into a student’s sexual harassment claim 
concerning a third-party instructor at a program that was unaffiliated with the university. Karasek v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 948 F.3d 1150, 1168 (9th Cir. 2020). In that case, a University of 
California (UC) student had been conducting paid research at a nonprofit in Alaska for a UC graduate 
student. Id. at 1159. She was harassed and assaulted by a part-time instructor who was not employed 
by the university. Id. The Ninth Circuit found that the university was not acting with deliberate 
indifference by ending the investigation after determining that the university’s policies did not apply 
to the unaffiliated program at issue. Id. at 1168. 
107. Letter from Kathleen Salvaty, supra note 37.  
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with the University.”108 
Both the Title IX Coordinator’s letter and the University of California’s 
Frequently Asked Questions webpage go on to explain that a report to the 
Title IX office must include “whatever information you have, including 
the names of any individuals involved, their contact information, and any 
details of the incident you have.”109 The consequences of failure to comply 
are stark: “An employee who does not comply with the Responsible 
Employee requirement may be subject to consequences for failing to 
report, which may include corrective actions, up to and 
including termination.”110 
But these mandates for addressing sexual harassment—prevent it when 
possible, and remedy it when it occurs—cannot always apply in the 
clinical context. This Part discusses the ethical concerns that arise when 
the problematic behavior involves a client to whom the clinic owes a duty 
of confidentiality and loyalty, as well as when it involves a witness or 
other relevant player in the case whose cooperation or information is 
integral to the client’s case. It also discusses why some of the possible 
solutions—such as assigning certain roles to certain students in order to 
minimize exposure to harassment—are likely to disproportionately 
disadvantage female students and cause Title IX problems of their own. 
Consider the hypothetical presented in the Introduction. The female 
student whose interview of the key sentencing witness was both 
successful and deeply uncomfortable likely experienced sexual 
harassment under at least some university definitions. It may not yet have 
risen to a level that was so “severe, pervasive, and objectively 
offensive”111 as to establish liability under Title IX, but it surely met the 
definition of sexual harassment articulated on the UC Berkeley faculty 
resources website: 
Behavior such as unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual 
favors and other conduct of a sexual nature . . . [or] conduct that 
affects a person’s employment or education or interferes with a 
person’s work or educational performance or creates an 
environment that a reasonable person would find intimidating, 
 
108. Id. 
109. FAQ: Important Facts About Professors, Supervisors and Other “Responsible Employees” 
Who Are Required to Report, U.C.: SEXUAL VIOLENCE PREVENTION & RESPONSE, 
https://sexualviolence.universityofcalifornia.edu/faq/responsible-employee.html 
[https://perma.cc/PAU2-PDPH]. 
110. Letter from Kathleen Salvaty, supra note 37. 
111. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 650 (1999). 
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hostile or offensive.112 
But what about the indigent client whose case depends on someone 
returning to the witness to obtain the favorable information? The clinic’s 
ethical obligation to the client is to advance the client’s interests within 
the bounds of the law and rules of professional responsibility; that is what 
it means to be a zealous advocate.113 Consistent with that ethical 
obligation, the best approach for the client may be for the female student 
to return to the witness to obtain the additional information.114 Certainly, 
the idea of reporting the name of the witness and details of the conduct to 
the campus Title IX office would be, as discussed below, an unthinkable 
breach of ethics. 
More than twenty-five years ago, Peter Jan Honigsberg, Marilynn 
Tham, and Gary Alexander surfaced the issue of harassment of attorneys 
by clients, highlighting both its pervasiveness and its disproportionate 
impact on female attorneys.115 The authors pointed out, as noted in 
section I.A, that the law protects attorneys from sexual harassment by 
clients—at least in those cases in which the employer knew or should have 
known of the misconduct and failed to take corrective action.116 As they 
explained, existing regulations and case law establishes that “[a]n attorney 
who is sexually harassed by a client could seek to hold the law firm, her 
 
112. FAQ: Understanding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, supra note 13 (drawn from but 
broader than EEOC definition).  
113. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (“A lawyer 
should pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction or personal inconvenience 
to the lawyer, and take whatever lawful and ethical measures are required to vindicate a client’s cause 
or endeavor. A lawyer must also act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and 
with zeal in advocacy upon the client’s behalf.”); Anita Bernstein, The Zeal Shortage, 34 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 1165, 1173 (2006) (“The experience of zeal resembles how you feel when you have a stake 
in an outcome, when a member of your family is involved in a matter, when you know something 
material and central in a dispute, or when you have worked in the area and have been through 
its battles.”). 
114. It is of course possible that the witness’s offensive behavior raises a red flag about his 
reliability, credibility, or fitness as a witness, all of which must be explored with the student attorneys. 
Perhaps a strategic approach would be to submit an affidavit from him to avoid having to present him 
in court. Perhaps he would not testify in any form but would still provide valuable leads for follow-up 
investigation. Perhaps he would end up being utterly unhelpful. But a hypothetical suggesting that his 
problematic behavior does not preclude his usefulness to the case seems entirely realistic. We take 
our cases as we find them, and witnesses that may support our client’s cause are often flawed in ways 
that we have to either accept or strategize around. 
115. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 19, at 719; see also Lea B. Vaughn, The Customer Is Always 
Right . . . Not! Employer Liability for Third Party Sexual Harassment, 9 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 1, 6–
7 (2002) (noting that female attorneys have reported client-instigated sexual harassment as early as 
1989, and that in a survey, 61.5% of 553 female litigators reported being sexually harassed by a client 
in the last five years).  
116. Honigsberg et al., supra note 19, at 720. 
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employer, responsible.”117 The authors make the case that “if the employer 
knows about the third party’s harassing conduct and takes no corrective 
measures, the employer impliedly supports the behavior,”118 and that “the 
law requires firms to prevent sexual harassment against employees from 
whatever source: employer, employee or outside third party.”119 The bar 
for taking corrective action in the law school clinical setting appears to be 
even lower than in the law firm setting, at least where Title IX guidelines 
require action even when Title VII does not.120 
Honigsberg, Tham, and Alexander, however, do not discuss harassing 
witnesses, and allude only briefly to the potential difficulty of 
withdrawing from the representation of a harassing client.121 Even then, 
they do not address confidentiality or loyalty requirements of the 
governing ethical standards. They appear to assume that if actionable 
sexual harassment occurs, an employer must step in and remedy the 
situation—an approach that seems appropriate at first blush. When 
considered alongside the lawyer’s ethical obligations to a client, however, 
this assumption, while appropriate in many settings (especially with 
corporate clients), is unsatisfying as a generalization. It is particularly 
unsatisfying in the context of a law school clinic engaged in the pro bono 
representation of clients who are indigent and typically do not have other 
options for high-quality representation. 
Particularly in cases that do not rise to the level of actionable 
harassment, it is far from clear that the steps a university’s Title IX office 
may require are consistent with clinical faculty members’ duty to their 
clients or their students. After all, clinics send people out into the field to 
conduct investigations and interview witnesses necessary to effectively 
and ethically represent the client. It would often do the client a disservice 
to avoid talking to a particular person, or to avoid going back to a witness 
or client who said something inappropriate, or to cease all visits to a 
specific jail or prison. 
Recall the examples noted in the Introduction, and consider the 
 
117. Id. 
118. Id. at 731–32. 
119. Id. at 734 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(f) (1993)).  
120. See, e.g., FAQ: Understanding Sexual Violence and Sexual Assault, supra note 13; Sexual and 
Gender-Based Harassment Policy, HARV. UNIV. POLICE DEP’T, 
https://www.hupd.harvard.edu/sexual-and-gender-based-harassment-policy [https://perma.cc/A336-
QZHN] (describing university employee Title IX requirements); Overview of Stanford Policies, 
STAN. UNIV.: SEXUAL HARASSMENT/ASSAULT RESPONSE & EDUC.-TITLE IX OFF., 
https://harass.stanford.edu/be-informed/overview-stanford-policies [https://perma.cc/THH4-DC8K] 
(describing school-wide policies that apply to all students, faculty, and staff who participate in 
Stanford’s programs and activities). 
121. Honigsberg et al., supra note 19, at 735 n.109. 
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response that Title IX arguably mandates. 
Addressed exclusively through a traditional Title IX lens, each of these 
scenarios appears to demand an intervention that, at the very least, ensures 
that the offending behavior stop, and that the student is not knowingly 
exposed to more of it. For example, the student getting cat-called at the 
juvenile prison would not be sent on any more tours of the prison, at least 
not until the incarcerated clients doing the cat-calling were reported and 
somehow prevented from engaging in further offensive behavior. The 
transgender student exposed to the critical witness who repeatedly makes 
inappropriate comments would either be taken off the case, or the clinic 
would have to withdraw from representation. And the student who would 
otherwise appear in front of the sexist judge would perhaps be assigned to 
a different case, if reporting the judge to his superiors was not feasible or 
did not address the misconduct. 
Now, though, consider the scenarios discussed above not only in the 
context of Title IX’s requirement that schools take necessary steps to halt 
harassment when they become aware of it, but also in the context of the 
lawyer’s duty to the client, and the clinical faculty member’s duty to the 
student. The student who is harassed while visiting the juvenile facility 
cannot simply stop visiting the facility, because an investigation into the 
conditions there is vital to the representation of her class action clients 
(who include people doing the cat-calling). Reporting the juvenile clients 
to authorities could land those clients in all sorts of legal and non-legal 
trouble. Similarly, the transgender student who had to endure 
inappropriate and probing questions about his gender identity may have 
established a rapport with a key witness that cannot be easily replicated 
by another student. Nor would it be fair to the student to replace him on 
the case with another student whose gender presentation does not provoke 
comments from an ignorant witness, thereby denying him the educational 
opportunity to work with a critical witness in the case. And with respect 
to the student who is set to appear in front of the sexist judge, simply 
transferring her case to a male student may deprive the female student of 
an educational opportunity. It would also do little to prepare her for 
practice, where she may very well appear in front of judges who expect 
women to dress in a certain way.122 It is also possible that seeking transfer 
 
122. The question of how and whether to conform to courtroom norms can be particularly fraught. 
See Bea Bischoff, I Dress ‘Straight’ to Protect My Clients, RACKED (July 5, 2017, 11:03 AM), 
https://www.racked.com/2017/7/5/15874342/queer-lawyer-straightness-performance 
[https://perma.cc/T5FA-BDJL]; see also Amanda Hess, Female Lawyers Who Dress Too “Sexy” Are 
Apparently a “Huge Problem” in the Courtroom, SLATE (Mar. 21, 2014, 9:38 AM), 
https://slate.com/human-interest/2014/03/female-lawyers-still-must-dress-conservatively-to-
impress-judges.html [https://perma.cc/3YZX-AVJY] (noting “a long legal tradition of professors, 
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of the case to a different judge may result in a worse outcome for the client 
(if, say, the sexist judge also happens to be a more lenient sentencer). 
The next sections take a closer look at the implications of the three most 
readily apparent remedies that might be appropriate in these cases under 
Title IX were it not for the unique clinical context: (1) report the offending 
behavior; (2) withdraw from the case; and (3) switch out the students. 
A. Report the Offending Behavior 
Reporting the misconduct, required by most Title IX offices, is fraught 
in the clinical context. For example, at UC Berkeley, recently-revised 
university policy requires that all “responsible employees” (i.e., mandated 
reporters) give the Title IX office the name of complainants as well as the 
name of the perpetrators of harassment.123 If a student came to the office 
of a clinical supervisor and told the supervisor that another clinical faculty 
member had been making inappropriate, sexually suggestive remarks, the 
supervisor’s Title IX obligations are clear: The behavior, including the 
names of both the student and the other faculty member, must be reported 
to the Title IX office. 
But the student who reports the client’s cat-calling to her clinical 
supervisor, for example, poses a more difficult problem. As the sexual 
harassment training recounted at the outset of this Article suggests, 
Title IX suggests that the supervisor should report the incident (including 
the client’s name) to the school’s Title IX office, as well as to officials at 
the juvenile facility in an attempt to remedy the misconduct and ensure it 
does not happen again. Yet while the Title IX obligations are relatively 
straightforward, no competent lawyer in that situation would report their 
own client in this manner, as it is hard, if not impossible, to square 
providing harmful information about your client’s behavior that could be 
used against him at sentencing or trial with the duty of “zeal in advocacy” 
that lawyers owe their clients.124 
 
judges, and fellow attorneys schooling female lawyers on just how to dress”). Bischoff discusses in 
this thoughtful essay how failing to recreate oneself in the midst of inequities faced by marginalized 
groups in the legal world reflects unfairly on one’s abilities and “impacts the incredibly high-stakes 
judicial proceedings in which . . . clients are caught up.” Bischoff, supra. She notes that “a client’s 
greatest chance at success rests on [one’s] ability to not only know the law, but also to understand and 
navigate extensive professional and social norms of the court system.” Id. These abilities, derived 
from choices in between, disproportionately impact those furthest from opportunity.  
123. Outside of certain limited enumerated employees, university employees cannot promise 
confidentiality to students if students disclose sexual harassment and/or sexual violence. See UNIV. 
OF CAL.: SYSTEMWIDE TITLE IX OFF., INTERIM POLICY: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND SEXUAL 
HARASSMENT 6, 8, 10–11 (2020), https://policy.ucop.edu/doc/4000385/SVSH (last visited Jan. 
20, 2021).  
124. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.3 cmt. 1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  
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The harassing witness presents no less of a dilemma. In the 
hypothetical described in the Introduction, the witness is the client’s 
brother, a key source of information needed for the upcoming sentencing 
hearing. Alienating this witness by reporting his name to a university’s 
Title IX office—thus triggering an investigation that the witness may find 
out about—will surely damage the relationship with him and work a real 
detriment to the client’s case.125 Even reprimanding him too harshly in the 
moment may inhibit rapport-building and adversely affect the case. 
Moreover, ethical rules in almost every jurisdiction preclude lawyers 
from disclosing any information “related to the representation” of a client. 
(Clinical law students are no less responsible for complying with the 
ethical rules governing practice in the jurisdiction.126) Forty-six states 
adopted ABA Model Rule of Professional Conduct 1.6 virtually 
verbatim.127 The rule states: “A lawyer shall not reveal information 
relating to the representation of a client unless the client gives informed 
consent [or] the disclosure is impliedly authorized in order to carry out the 
representation . . . .”128 The provision goes on to include exceptions 
allowing (or in some states mandating) disclosure of information in 
relatively rare situations, such as when disclosure may prevent the client 
from committing a crime or to establish a defense on behalf of the lawyer 
in a controversy between the lawyer and the client.129 A client’s 
harassment during a legal visit to the prison, for example, certainly relates 
to the representation if it happened during the course of the representation 
and if disclosure would affect the representation. Indeed, if privileged 
 
125. Even where lack of control over a third party limits a university’s remedial options with 
respect to that third party, the university can seek to impose remedial measures that tie the hands of 
university employees. So, although a university’s Title IX office may not be able to sanction a 
third-party witness without police intervention, if it seeks to restrict further contact between clinic 
personnel and that witness, the damage may be done. 
126. In general, law students are expected to comply with the same ethical obligations that govern 
practicing attorneys. See MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 5.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020) (providing 
that a “lawyer having direct supervisory authority over the nonlawyer shall make reasonable efforts 
to ensure that the person’s conduct is compatible with the professional obligations of the lawyer” and 
can be held responsible for any non-compliant conduct by the non-lawyer); see also U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUST., LAW STUDENT INTERN/EXTERN ETHICAL OBLIGATIONS AGREEMENT 1 (2019), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/1147781/download [https://perma.cc/Q6CA-L85K] (instructing legal 
externs that they “generally will be expected to conform [their] conduct to the applicable rules of 
professional conduct governing attorneys, as well as other laws and regulations”). 
127. See Ty Alper, Criminal Defense Attorney Confidentiality in the Age of Social Media, 31 CRIM. 
JUST., no. 3, 2016, at 4–5, 7, 9 (discussing the nuances of Rule 1.6 in the context of disclosures on 
social media of information “related to the representation of the client”). 
128. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
129. Id.; see also id. cmt. 4 (“This prohibition also applies to disclosures by a lawyer that do not in 
themselves reveal protected information but could reasonably lead to the discovery of such 
information by a third person.”).  
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information is requested by another governing body, lawyers actually 
have the duty to fight disclosure.130  
B. Withdraw from the Case 
Can the clinic simply withdraw from the case, perhaps without 
reporting the client or witness? After all, one solution to sexual 
harassment is to remove the perpetrator from the situation that has 
provided the opportunity for harassment.131 It is a tempting solution but 
one that, depending on the kind of clinic, in reality is very unlikely to be 
consistent with the clinical mission or the duties owed to the client. 
An attorney’s right to withdraw from a case is not automatic and is 
often contingent on the court’s agreement.132 
Courts consider several factors when considering a motion for 
withdrawal, including (1) the reasons counsel seeks to withdraw; 
(2) the possible prejudice that withdrawal may cause to other 
litigants; (3) the harm that withdrawal might cause to the 
administration of justice; and (4) the extent to which withdrawal 
will delay resolution of the case.133 
Ethical rules generally permit withdrawal when the client’s conduct 
leaves the attorney with no other choice. For example, ABA Model Rule 
of Professional Conduct 1.16(b)(6) allows for withdrawal if 
representation has been “rendered unreasonably difficult by the client.”134 
State Bar of California Rule 1.16(b)(4) states that a lawyer may withdraw 
 
130. A comment to ABA Model Rule 1.6 states that 
[a] lawyer may be ordered to reveal information relating to the representation of a client by a 
court or by another tribunal or governmental entity claiming authority pursuant to other law to 
compel the disclosure. Absent informed consent of the client to do otherwise, the lawyer should 
assert on behalf of the client all nonfrivolous claims that the order is not authorized by other law 
or that the information sought is protected against disclosure by the attorney-client privilege or 
other applicable law. 
MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.6 cmt. 15 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020).  
131. See Elizabeth M. Viglianti, Andrea L. Oliverio & Lisa M. Meeks, Sexual Harassment and 
Abuse: When the Patient Is the Perpetrator, 392 LANCET 368, 369 (2018) (suggesting that in certain 
circumstances, patients who harass physicians should be transferred to other care providers). 
132. See, e.g., United States v. Carter, 560 F.3d 1107, 1113 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that the district 
court did not abuse its discretion by denying defense counsel’s motion to withdraw because the 
circumstances motivating the withdrawal were not “egregious” and the motion was made on the third 
day of trial); Garcia v. Zavala, No. 17-CV-06253-TSH, 2019 WL 2088478, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 13, 
2019) (granting counsel’s motion to withdraw where the client had made it “unreasonably difficult to 
carry out his representation”), order set aside in part, No. C 17-6253 MMC, 2020 WL 999779 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 2, 2020).  
133. Atkins v. Bank of Am., No. 15-cv-00051-MEJ, 2015 WL 4150744, at *1 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 
2015) (citing Deal v. Countrywide Home Loans, No. C 09-01643 SBA, 2010 WL 3702459, at *2 
(N.D. Cal. Sept. 15, 2010)). 
134. MODEL RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 1.16 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2020). 
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if “the client by other conduct renders it unreasonably difficult for the 
lawyer to carry out the representation effectively.”135 
In California, before withdrawal is permitted, counsel must take steps 
to avoid reasonably foreseeable prejudice to the rights of the client, 
including giving sufficient notice to the client to allow time for 
employment of other counsel.136 Further, 
[w]hen withdrawal by an attorney from an action is not 
accompanied by simultaneous appearance of substitute counsel or 
agreement of the party to appear pro se, leave to withdraw may 
be subject to the condition that papers may continue to be served 
on counsel for forwarding purposes, unless and until the client 
appears by other counsel or pro se.137 
In other words, contact and communication with the client may 
continue even after a successful withdrawal. 
Depending on the nature of the practice, it can be difficult for a lawyer 
to minimize prejudice to their client. Many law school clinics provide 
representation that is otherwise unavailable to clients who are indigent.138 
What if the client is unable to find another lawyer who will provide free 
representation? What if representation that is available is of much poorer 
quality than that which the law school clinic can provide? What if 
successfully moving to withdraw from a case requires the disclosure of 
client confidences that paint the client in an unsympathetic light before a 
judge who will have to impose a sentence, or rule on liability?139 
It seems clear that the ethical and court rules, to the extent they are 
permissive, are more likely to allow withdrawal when it is the client—as 
opposed to a witness or some other actor over whom the client has no 
control—who renders the representation unreasonably difficult. But even 
 
135. CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r 1.16 (CAL. BAR ASS’N 2018). In Atkins v. Bank of America, 
the court found that withdrawal was appropriate because the relationship between the firm and the 
client had completely broken down, to the point where the firm was no longer able to communicate 
with the client. No. 15-cv-00051-MEJ, 2015 WL 4150744, at *2 (N.D. Cal. July 9, 2015).  
136. See El Hage v. U.S. Sec. Assocs., Inc., No. C06-7828 TEH, 2007 WL 4328809, at *1 
(N.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2007) (citing CAL. RULES OF PRO. CONDUCT r. 3-700(A)(2)). 
137. N.D. CAL. CIV. R. 11-5(b) (2018); see also Zavala, 2019 WL 2088478, at *3 (granting 
counsel’s motion to withdraw and finding that she had taken “reasonable steps to avoid foreseeable 
prejudice” to her client). 
138. See, e.g., David Luban, Taking Out the Adversary: The Assault on Progressive Public-Interest 
Lawyers, 91 CALIF. L. REV. 209, 236 (2003) (quoting estimates that law school clinics provide 
millions of hours each year of free student legal work for needy clients). 
139. At least one court took the word of the lawyer without requiring disclosure of client 
confidences: “We conclude the public defender’s disclosure was sufficient to permit withdrawal, and 
the trial court should have granted the motion instead of placing the attorney in the untenable position 
of asserting the client’s constitutional right to effective assistance only by sacrificing client 
confidences.” Aceves v. Superior Ct., 59 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 281 (Cal. 1996). 
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if the applicable ethical and legal rules permit withdrawal, such action 
may be antithetical to the mission of the clinic or just utterly impractical 
given the nature of the representation. If the client is the harasser, a 
supervising attorney might consider withdrawing from the case. But in the 
context of a mission-driven clinic, the decision to withdraw is not at all 
straightforward. For example, many law school clinics with public interest 
and/or social justice missions take on cases of clients who otherwise 
cannot obtain representation, perhaps because of indigency but also 
perhaps because they are “challenging” clients.140 As one experienced 
clinician who taught for many years in a community-based economic and 
racial justice law clinic told me: “We represent clients who fail out of 
representation. We don’t abandon our clients, even the ones that cause us 
discomfort. We run towards the discomfort and do our best to prepare our 
students for it.”141 
If the litigation is complex and spans many years, a clinic is highly 
unlikely to withdraw from the case even if a client or witness poses 
significant problems. For example, some clinics are engaged in multi-year 
class action litigation to which a great deal of time and resources have 
been expended.142 In the clinic I teach in, we represent the same 
death-sentenced clients for years and even decades in jurisdictions that do 
not otherwise provide counsel to such individuals.143 It is difficult to 
imagine a scenario in which we would be inclined to withdraw from one 
of our client’s cases, or be able to do so without causing tremendous 
 
140. See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 42, at 997 (“[L]aw schools do have some obligation to 
contribute to the solution of the crisis in access to justice, and it seems obvious that the obligation is 
best accomplished by law school clinics assisting low-income individuals and communities that are 
underserved or have particular difficulty obtaining lawyers because of the nature of their 
legal problems.”). 
141. Interview with Tirien Steinbach, former Exec. Dir., E. Bay Cmty. L. Ctr., in Berkeley, Cal. 
(Aug. 18, 2018).  
142. See Stephanie Ashe, Stanford Law School Immigrants’ Rights Clinic Files Class Action 
Lawsuit on Behalf of Immigrant Detainees, STAN. L. SCH. (Dec. 17, 2018), 
https://law.stanford.edu/press/stanford-law-school-immigrants-rights-clinic-files-class-action-
lawsuit-on-behalf-of-immigrant-detainees/ [https://perma.cc/FQQ3-Y2H3]. Certainly, withdrawal in 
some practice settings is more feasible than others. In some misdemeanor clinics, for example, it may 
be easier for a clinic to withdraw from a case where a local public defender’s office is equipped to 
provide high-quality representation to the clinic’s client. 
143. See Erica Wright, Family of Alabama Death Row Inmate Seeks Just Mercy, BIRMINGHAM 
TIMES (Feb. 19, 2020), https://www.birminghamtimes.com/2020/02/family-alabama-death-row-
inmate-seeks-justice-mercy/ [https://perma.cc/HNN9-D3NR] (noting that the Berkeley Law Death 
Penalty Clinic has been representing an Alabama death-sentenced client for almost two decades); 
Scott Michels, Death Penalty Appeal Without a Lawyer, ABC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2009, 1:28 PM), 
https://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/story?id=3259389&page=1 [https://perma.cc/92TN-XUKN] 
(noting that “Alabama is one of only two states in the country that does not provide poor death row 
inmates with lawyers for post-conviction review of their cases”). 
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damage to the client’s interests.144 
C. Switch Out the Students 
Short of reporting the client or withdrawing from the representation, 
clinical faculty may consider removing the student from the 
problematic situation. 
To be clear, no student should be forced to endure harassment or abuse 
of any kind, and students who are not comfortable meeting with a 
particular client or witness should not be required to do so. Student choice 
matters here. And it is incumbent on the clinician to take pains to ensure 
that students feel safe expressing their true feelings, and are not feeling 
pressured to be “okay” with what their clinical supervisors—who may 
grade them and/or provide letters of reference—think is in the best interest 
of the clients. 
Reflexively switching out students when there is a real potential for 
harassment is not, however, a generally acceptable solution for at least 
two reasons. First, students need to continue to develop approaches to 
navigating such situations. The #MeToo movement has accelerated what 
we can envision as the end of gender-based violence and harassment, but 
the world we live in will remain a sexist one long after our students 
graduate.145 A fundamental purpose of the clinic is to allow students to 
practice as attorneys in a context where they are closely supervised by 
professors who are also practicing attorneys so that they can be educated 
in the context of real work practice.146 Clinical education is precisely for 
 
144. I do acknowledge that there is at least some evidence that lawyers overestimate their 
capabilities and importance. See Jeffrey Selbin, Jeanne Charn, Anthony Alfieri & Stephen Wizner, 
Service Delivery, Resource Allocation, and Access to Justice: Greiner and Pattanayak and the 
Research Imperative, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 45 (2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/service-
delivery-resource-allocation-and-access-to-justice-greiner-and-pattanayak-and-the-research-
imperative [https://perma.cc/7LD2-HBXM]; Jane Goodman-Delahunty, Pär Anders Granhag, Maria 
Hartwig & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Insightful or Wishful: Lawyers’ Ability to Predict Case Outcomes, 16 
PSYCH. PUB. POL’Y & L. 133, 151, 153 (2010) (finding in a national study that lawyers are 
overconfident in their litigation-outcome predictions, even in the face of debiasing techniques). 
145. Jamillah Bowman Williams, Lisa Singh & Naomi Mezey, #MeToo as Catalyst: A Glimpse 
into 21st Century Activism, 2019 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 371, 372–73 (explaining that the #MeToo 
movement is a social movement against sexual violence and sexual assault that advocates for 
survivors to speak out about their experience). 
146. See, e.g., Clinics, GEORGETOWN L., https://www.law.georgetown.edu/experiential-
learning/clinics/ [https://perma.cc/H4BQ-7QAG] (“Through this program, students learn the practical 
art of lawyering while providing quality legal representation to under-represented individuals and 
organizations.”); Clinical Programs, STURM COLL. OF L., https://www.law.du.edu/academics/ 
practical-experience/clinical-programs [https://perma.cc/E4JK-MFWR] (“Each of these programs 
provides legal assistance and representation to populations that don’t often have access to 
representation, all while giving students specialized, hands-on experience that will help them make 
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teaching how to help students identify, confront, and solve the complex 
ethical and strategic problems they will face in practice.147 To navigate is 
not to tolerate or ignore, but neither is it to sidestep. It is to use the 
challenges of practice as teaching opportunities in service both of the 
client and the student’s education. 
Second, prophylactically taking certain experiences away from 
students who may be subjected to sexual harassment would almost surely 
affect female students (and probably gender non-binary and transgender 
students as well) disproportionately, thereby denying an equal educational 
opportunity and thwarting the very purpose of Title IX.148 It would both 
provide these students with fewer experiential opportunities and less 
preparation for dealing with such situations when they enter practice, 
which is one of the primary goals of the clinical enterprise in the first 
place. This may be a practical solution in some medical contexts, where 
trainees can be reassigned to other patients who could ostensibly provide 
the student with an equivalent learning opportunity.149 The same cannot 
be said in the context of clinical legal education (particularly low-volume 
clinics serving clients who are indigent), where there may very well not 
be another legal case available that provides the same 
educational opportunities. 
Consider, again, the hypothetical in the Introduction. A female student 
 
an immediate, valuable impact in their chosen fields.”); Clinics, N.Y. UNIV. L., 
https://www.law.nyu.edu/academics/clinics [https://perma.cc/8G49-VZWR] (“Clinics advance the 
instruction to which students already have been exposed, diversify the skill sets available for effective 
legal problem solving, and deepen an increasingly coherent sense of how lawyers might best do their 
work. At the same time, clinics exhort students to appreciate just how much they must grow over the 
course of their careers. Problems evolve, and so must problem solvers if they are to become and 
remain expert in the practice of law.”); Wizner & Aiken, supra note 42, at 998 (“[C]linics began at 
many law schools primarily as programs to enable law students to provide free legal services to the 
poor or to bring important impact litigation, under the supervision of practicing attorneys. . . . Clinics 
were about skills training, providing service, influencing policy, and developing future legal aid and 
civil rights lawyers.”). 
147. See Lawrence C. Marshall, David Mills & Stephanie Mills, The Need for Clinical Education, 
STAN. LAW., Spring 2012, https://law.stanford.edu/stanford-lawyer/articles/the-need-
%E2%80%A8for-clinical-education/ [https://perma.cc/J6AP-MQDR] (“Law students need to 
develop expertise in problem solving, not just issue spotting. They need to cultivate their ethical 
constitutions and learn how a lawyer effectively deals with clients, adversaries, agencies, courts, 
and others.”). 
148. Bowman & Lipp, supra note 38, at 96 (noting that workplace sexual harassment in the 
university internship setting disproportionately affects women); Honigsberg et al., supra note 19, at 
719 (highlighting that client harassment of attorneys disproportionately impacts women). 
149. See Viglianti et al., supra note 131, at 369 (suggesting that in certain circumstances, patients 
who harass physicians should be transferred to other care providers); see also Susan Phillips, Sexual 
Harassment of Female Physicians by Patients: What Is to Be Done?, 42 CANADIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 
73, 74 (1996) (finding that 31% of the surveyed female physicians who reported being harassed 
subsequently refused to treat the patient who harassed them).  
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is harassed by a key witness during an interview. She was deeply unsettled 
by the experience, but says she is willing to return if it will help the client. 
If the supervisor responds by sending only the male student back to the 
witness (perhaps with a male partner), the client may suffer because, 
recalling the facts of the hypothetical, the male student is unlikely to 
obtain as much helpful information. But it also may be true that this 
“remedy” denies the female student the opportunity to interview that 
critical witness. Because there is no guarantee that there will be other 
witnesses who could provide an equivalent interviewing or witness 
preparation experience, the female student is deprived of the opportunity 
to learn both how to interview and prepare a witness, and how to navigate 
a situation in which a witness is offensive but also helpful to the case of a 
client who is indigent and has no other options for legal representation. 
Removing the female student from the case thus may even raise a 
Title IX concern itself because it could effectively deny or limit female 
students’ ability to fully participate or benefit from this specific 
educational program, or be viewed as punishing the student for reporting 
misconduct.150 Recall that one of the wrong answers to my sexual 
harassment training quiz was to drop the student from the psychology 
practicum after she complained about the conduct of one of the 
intellectually-disabled individuals she was assigned to counsel. The 
training explains that this is the wrong answer because “[d]ropping [the 
student] from the counseling duties without consulting her first could be 
seen as retaliation for her complaint.”151 Surely, addressing a claim of 
sexual harassment by denying a female student an equal opportunity to 
learn in an experiential setting is not the answer. 
III. EMBRACING THE TITLE IX CHALLENGE 
This is not an article about evading Title IX in order to protect clinical 
clients at the expense of student well-being. We all have an obligation to 
eliminate and address sexual harassment at every possible opportunity. 
Indeed, the primary purpose of Title IX is to “protect[] people from 
discrimination based on sex in education programs or activities that 
 
150. Of course, it is true that both students may still participate in the key lawyering task of strategic 
deliberation about who should handle which parts of a case, and a good clinician would involve the 
students in the decision-making about how to proceed. And most live client clinics do not necessarily 
guarantee students any particular experience. All that said, removing a student from the opportunity 
to engage in a core lawyering competency, if it is contrary to her expressed wishes, because of a broad 
edict from a university’s Title IX office is not the kind of decision that is generally made in the world 
of real-life practice. 
151. See Graphic, supra note 1. 
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receive Federal financial assistance.”152 When the educational program is 
one that aims to teach students by placing them in the role of 
professionals, Title IX requires, rather than precludes, a clinical setting in 
which all students have the opportunity to learn how to navigate the 
challenges that come along with that professional role. Title IX is not the 
obstacle here; it is the guiding principle and requires that clinical faculty 
both protect students from third-party harassment, and embrace the 
teaching opportunity that it can, at times, present. 
OCR warns in its 2001 Revised Sexual Harassment Guidance: “If 
harassment has occurred, doing nothing is always the wrong response.”153 
I agree. But I also agree with the next sentence: “However, depending on 
the circumstances, there may be more than one right way to respond.”154 
And the reasonableness of the response must take into account the specific 
educational context in which the harassment occurred. As the Supreme 
Court explained in Davis, the Title IX standard is “sufficiently flexible” 
to account for different educational settings: “A university might not, for 
example, be expected to exercise the same degree of control over its 
students that a grade school would enjoy . . . .”155 As the Ninth Circuit 
recently put it, “the reasonableness of the response depends on the 
educational setting involved.”156 
There may very well be extreme cases in which behavior of a third 
party is so egregious or violent that the remedies a traditional Title IX 
analysis might suggest—withdrawal from the case, reporting to the 
Title IX office—are appropriate and trump the ethical and practical 
considerations that would normally counsel against such a response. But, 
as explained in Part II, in the vast majority of cases involving clients who 
are indigent, exposure of students to third-party harassment cannot lead to 
withdrawal, reporting of the third party, or removal of students. Instead, 
the reality that students will—and do—face third-party harassment (as 
they will when they become lawyers) presents the obligation, and 
opportunity, for clinicians to teach students how to provide high-quality 
representation to clients without other options while minimizing the 
damage that can be done by exposure to unwelcome conduct. 
Recall the Title VII prison cases discussed above, in which prison 
employees sued after being subjected to harassment from people who are 
incarcerated. As one court explained, 
 
152. Title IX and Sex Discrimination, OFF. FOR C.R., U.S. DEP’T OF EDUC.: 
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/tix_dis.html [https://perma.cc/B4ST-FY3L]. 
153. REVISED SEXUAL HARASSMENT GUIDANCE, supra note 38. 
154. Id. 
155. Davis v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 649 (1999). 
156. Karasek v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 948 F.3d 1150, 1162 (9th Cir. 2020). 
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The propensity of courts to decline imposing liability for prisoner 
acts is based on solid logical and practical foundations: anyone 
who works at a prison, particularly in a position with frequent 
inmate contact, must expect some off-color interactions. Prison 
employees inherently assume the risk of some rude inmates.157 
However, even this court went on to nevertheless require prisons to 
“implement and enforce policies reasonably calculated to minimize such 
harassment and protect the safety of its employees.”158 
What can clinicians do to “implement and enforce policies reasonably 
calculated to minimize . . . harassment and protect the safety”159 of its 
students? After all, it is not enough to say that Title IX should be read 
narrowly in these circumstances to absolve clinics of any responsibility 
for keeping students safe. Not only would a failure to do so run afoul of 
Title IX in some circumstances, it would also represent a failure of the 
clinical mission, which is to teach students how to excel in a professional 
setting in which they will soon find themselves. The behavior to which 
students are occasionally subjected in the clinical setting is indeed akin to 
what they will face in practice, and it is critical that they develop strategies 
and approaches for eliminating (where possible) and mitigating (when 
necessary) harassing behavior while at the same time maintaining client 
confidences and providing zealous representation. In this Part, I offer 
suggestions for doing so. 
A. Introduction to the Sacrifice Inherent in Representing Clients  
The Title IX conundrum presented here offers clinical law students a 
tangible lesson in the constraints that duty to a client—especially a client 
who is indigent—places on them. 
The constraints are not all-encompassing, to be sure. Lawyers do not 
have to put up with anything a client or witness does, and the setting 
matters. No lawyer or student need tolerate a client’s threats of violence 
or sexual assault, for example, and such behavior may be grounds for 
withdrawal from the case in either a clinical or non-clinical setting. And 
female associates in law firms, for instance, should not have to tolerate 
sexual harassment at the hands of corporate clients, simply because they 
have better “rapport” with the client than some of the male attorneys. As 
Honigsberg, Tham, and Alexander argued as early as 1994, and as the 
Title VII discussion in section I.A above makes clear, law firms have an 
obligation to protect employees from harassment and abuse by clients that 
 
157. Powell v. Morris, 37 F. Supp. 2d 1011, 1017 (S.D. Ohio 1999). 
158. Id.  
159. Id.  
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they know or should know about.160 To say that lawyers, especially 
women, experience harassment on the job is not to suggest that it should 
not be arrested and remedied whenever possible. This is true even if it 
means employing one of the remedies discussed above—particularly 
withdrawal from the case or switching out personnel on a case. In the 
private law setting, where clients have more options and Title IX does not 
govern, the obligation of employers under Title VII to protect employees 
from harassment may take on a greater importance and may simply be 
easier to do within the bounds of the ethical rules. 
At the same time, the clinical law setting is different, both because of 
the educational mission and because many law school clinics serve clients 
who have no other realistic options for legal representation. In this setting, 
lawyers “put up with” harassment of all kinds. Not all harassment, to be 
sure, and not all the time. But a critical component of clinical education is 
teaching students how to practice; this is unfortunately a part of practicing 
that they will have to negotiate. Students should have to learn and 
understand their ethical obligations as well as how best to protect 
themselves in different legal settings without violating their duty to their 
clients. If we fail to teach them this, we are failing them. 
B. The Usefulness and Limits of the Medical School Analogy 
Clinicians should equip law students with both the awareness of what 
they are likely to face and the tools to navigate those inevitable situations. 
The pedagogy of other disciplines is instructive, at least to a point. The 
field of medicine is an obvious place to look, as health care providers face 
harassment from third parties at least as often as those in the legal 
profession.161 According to the director of the Mayo Clinic’s Office of 
Diversity and Inclusion: “This has been one of medicine’s dirty little 
secrets since women began practicing medicine . . . . Victims are 
 
160. See Honigsberg et al., supra note 19, at 734 (describing the phenomenon of client-initiated 
sexual harassment in the legal sector and arguing that firms are legally required to protect their 
employees from sexual harassment regardless of whether the harasser is an employer, employee, or 
third party). 
161. A 2014 meta-study found that 59.4% of medical trainees experienced harassment or 
discrimination during their training. Naif Fnais, Charlene Soobiah, Maggie Hong Chen, Erin Lillie, 
Laure Perrier, Mariam Tashkhandi, Sharon E. Straus, Muhammad Mamdani, Mohammed Al-Omran 
& Andrea C. Tricco, Harassment and Discrimination in Medical Training: A Systematic Review and 
Meta-Analysis, 89 ACAD. MED. 817, 817 (2014). Although consultants were the most frequent 
perpetrators at 34.4%, patients and their families constituted 21.9% of the harassers. Id. An earlier 
study in 1993 found that three quarters of female residents were sexually harassed by physicians. 
Miriam Komaromy, Andrew B. Bindman, Richard J. Haber & Merle A. Sande, Sexual Harassment 
in Medical Training, 328 NEW ENG. J. MED. 322, 322–23 (1993).  
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predominantly young women.”162 
On one hand, the options appear limited in some of the same ways they 
are limited in law.163 U.S. medical associations often do not investigate 
claims of sexual harassment when the perpetrators are patients; 
investigations tend only to be conducted into claims against peers and 
supervisors.164 National governing institutions for medical training, both 
in the United States and abroad, provide sexual harassment guidance only 
when the perpetrator is a peer or supervisor.165 As one commentator has 
lamented: “There is no clear guidance on how to respond to 
patient-initiated sexual harassment and abuse when the physician is tasked 
with caring for the health of the patient, while at the same time potentially 
diminishing her own health or safety.”166 
Yet some medical schools and teaching hospitals have begun to 
implement proactive approaches to third-party harassment, typically by 
patients. Yale Medical School, for example, recently implemented a new 
framework for faculty managing patient mistreatment of trainees called 
ERASE.167 ERASE stands for Expect (expect patient misbehavior to 
occur), Recognize (develop a sense for whether a patient has crossed a 
line), Address (have a script prepared to address and hopefully stop the 
behavior), Support (seek support from colleagues and provide it to them 
as well), and Establish/Encourage (advocate for institutions to proactively 
address patient harassment).168 Thus, using the ERASE framework, 
“supervising physicians should expect that mistreatment will happen, 
recognize when mistreatment occurs, address the situation in real time, 
support the trainee after the event, and establish a positive culture.”169 
 
162. Amy Paturel, When the Perpetrators Are Patients, AAMC: NEWS & INSIGHTS (Oct. 23, 
2018), https://www.aamc.org/news-insights/when-perpetrators-are-patients 
[https://perma.cc/D8VY-H4YD]. 
163. See id. (explaining that one of the reasons that harassment is so common in the medical context 
is because physicians are “professionally obligated to prioritize their patients’ needs above their 
own”); Viglianti et al., supra note 131, at 369 (rejecting the traditional view that patient-initiated 
harassment was simply a hazard of the physician’s job and arguing that the medical establishment 
needs to address this issue). 
164. Naveed Saleh, What to Do if You’re Sexually Harassed by a Patient, MDLINX (Feb. 4, 2019), 
https://www.mdlinx.com/internal-medicine/article/3370 [https://perma.cc/4C2U-T3X7] (explaining 
how national medical associations fail to address patient-perpetrated acts of sexual harassment and 
arguing that these acts should not be tolerated by the medical establishment). 
165. Viglianti et al., supra note 131, at 369 (proposing a “[d]ecision-guiding algorithm for 
physicians who experience patient-initiated” harassment). 
166. Id. 
167. Matthew N. Goldenberg, Kali D. Cyrus & Kirsten M. Wilkins, ERASE: A New Framework 
for Faculty to Manage Patient Mistreatment of Trainees, 43 ACAD. PSYCHIATRY 396, 396–97 (2019). 
168. Id. at 396–98. 
169. Id. at 396 (emphasis omitted). 
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The ERASE action framework identifies the problem, an example, the 
recommended intervention, and sample language for providers to use 
when they are subjected to harassment.170 The approach focuses on the 
ability of supervisors to recognize harassment and mistreatment when it 
has occurred, intervening in real-time when the harassment occurs, and 
providing support to the trainee.171 To implement the ERASE framework, 
supervisors arrange training sessions that involve first discussing the 
problem of sexual harassment, including both statistics and personal 
narratives, and then practicing applying the framework to 
specific situations.172 
Georgetown University’s School of Medicine has introduced what it 
calls a “Stop, Talk, Roll” campaign. Designed to address sexual 
harassment, racism, and bullying, the campaign described a three-step 
process: (1) Stop the conversation and immediately consult with a 
supervisor; (2) Talk through a tough patient encounter with that 
supervisor; and (3) ”Roll on out” and get support from a variety of listed 
services, after the shift is over.173 The approach provides a script with 
sample language for each of these steps.174 
There is also academic literature from the medical context. For 
example, Elizabeth Viglianti, a clinical lecturer at the University of 
Michigan, has called for “clear guidelines and policies” that both support 
the physician and guarantee “that the patient continues to receive 
appropriate medical care.”175 Viglianti extrapolated from literature on 
working with racist patients to develop a decision-making algorithm for 
dealing with patient-initiated harassment.176 The algorithm first asks 
 
170. Id. at 397. 
171. Id. 
172. Id. at 398. 
173. Susan Cheng, Stop, Talk, Roll: How to Deal with Tough Communication Exchanges in the 
Medical Workplace, GEORGETOWN UNIV. SCH. OF MED. (May 10, 2017), 
https://som.georgetown.edu/diversityandinclusion/studentorganizations/stoptalkroll/ 
[https://perma.cc/J42M-J8TC].  
174. Id. The Mayo Clinic has also developed training modules, facilitated discussions, and 
role-playing exercises to address and better prepare doctors for dealing with patient harassment. See 
HR at Your FingerTIPS: Patient Conduct, MAYO CLINIC, https://connect.employees.mayo.edu/ 
page/hratyourfingertips/tab/misconduct/ [https://perma.cc/8L6K-WERX]; see also Jacquelyn Corley, 
It’s Not Just Bosses Who Harass Health Workers: Hospitals Start Addressing Patients’ ‘Egregious’ 
Behavior, STAT NEWS (Sept. 12, 2019), https://www.statnews.com/2019/09/12/sexual-harassment-
hospitals-start-addressing-patient-behavior/ [https://perma.cc/S9ZX-4SBT] (describing the Mayo 
Clinic’s new reporting process and protocol for dealing with patients who sexually harass 
staff members). 
175. Viglianti et al., supra note 131, at 369. 
176. Id. 
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whether the physician feels safe.177 If she does, the physician is first 
advised to ask the patient to stop.178 If she does not, the physician is 
advised to exit the situation and seek help from a colleague or 
supervisor.179 The ultimate step in this algorithm is to consider 
transferring the patient to another provider, a proposed resolution that 
highlights the limits of the medical analogy for the law school clinic.180 
Some of the training developed by medical schools can surely be 
adapted for use in the clinical law context, and much of it is sound, 
common-sense advice. The innovation of these programs is in the 
proactive recognition that patient harassment is likely to occur, and that 
the goal is to provide high-quality patient care while still protecting the 
healthcare provider. The problem is that these trainings tend to teach 
young doctors how to extricate themselves gracefully in the moment, and 
then seek alternative providers for the harassing patient. The desire to 
ensure quality patient care in spite of the harassment is laudable, but the 
alacrity with which these trainings tend to suggest that the harassed 
provider will not continue with the care is problematic in the legal context 
for the reasons discussed in Part II. 
For example, the Georgetown training provides the following script for 
how to respond when a patient says something offensive or harassing: “I 
am not comfortable with your comments. I am going to consult with the 
supervising physician to ensure you receive the appropriate care by the 
right people.”181 The first sentence is a good example of a firm, respectful 
response to a patient (or client, or witness, or judge) who says something 
inappropriate, and it is similar to what we teach our students to say when 
they encounter offensive comments in their clinical work. But the second 
sentence is unsettling, as it appears to imply that someone else will likely 





180. Id. There is also a growing literature discussing racist patients. For example, Courteous 
Containment Is Not Enough features a series of commentaries from health professionals recounting 
interactions with racist patients, and explaining that this is a common and difficult issue within the 
profession. Pippa Gough, Commentary: Courteous Containment Is Not Enough, 318 BRIT. MED. J. 
1131, 1131 (1999). Pippa Gough writes that remaining courteous is often an untenable response 
because it could be interpreted as tacit acceptance of racism. Id. at 1131. She suggests that the 
withdrawal of service may be appropriate where abuse is “persistent and intentional.” Id.; see also 
Pauline W. Chen, When the Patient Is Racist, N.Y. TIMES: WELL (July 25, 2013, 3:56 PM), 
https://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/25/when-the-patient-is-racist/ [https://perma.cc/N4GN-
RZ4E] (arguing that “much more needs to be done to foster open and nuanced discussions of the 
profession’s attitude toward race and ethnicity and to assess the profession’s at times overly exuberant 
interpretations of ‘putting the patient first’”). 
181. Cheng, supra note 173.  
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“withdrawal from the case” is acceptable not as a last resort, but as an 
acceptable tool to employ at the first instance of offensive behavior. I am 
not equipped to comment on the ethical propriety of switching care 
providers in the medical field in response to patient harassment (although 
in the context of a medical residency, Title IX would seem to caution 
against the reflexive removal of female residents from the care of 
harassing patients). In any event, for the reasons discussed in Part II, 
removal of the student from the case is not a useful model in the context 
of a law school clinic serving clients who are indigent. 
C. Teaching Law Students How to Navigate Third-Party Sexual 
Harassment 
The job of law school clinicians is to allow law students not only to 
imagine themselves as professionals, but to act in role as professionals, 
with the “safety net” of experienced clinical supervisors at the ready when 
they encounter the challenges inherent in legal representation. As Jane 
Aiken and Steve Wizner noted in 2004, 
Unless we design our clinics to immerse students in the delivery 
of legal services to clients, we teach them too little about legal 
services work [and] underexpose them to the real world of 
low-income clients . . . and thus fail to meet the law school’s 
obligation to make a meaningful contribution to addressing the 
access to justice problem.182 
Certainly, clinicians should be proactively preparing students, 
especially female students, for harassment and sexism they are likely to 
experience in the practice of law. That proactive preparation, if it does not 
already, should borrow from other fields such as medicine and journalism 
where educators have developed trainings, like the ones described above, 
that equip students with language to use when uncomfortable and/or 
dangerous situations arise. But the proactive training is only a part of a 
comprehensive approach. 
 
182. See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 42, at 1006; see also Ibijoke Patricia Byron, The Relationship 
Between Social Justice and Clinical Legal Education: A Case Study of the Women’s Law Clinic, 
Faculty of Law, University of Ibadan, Nigeria, 20 INT’L J. CLINICAL LEGAL EDUC. 563, 568 (2014) 
(“Clinical legal education gives a window of opportunity to students by getting them out of the 
classroom into the real world of law, from which they return to a deeper understanding of how legal 
doctrine and legal theory actually works -or does not work and therefore, instilling in them the value 
and duty of public service.”); Kathleen J. Sullivan, From Heartbreak to Hope: Stanford Law Students 
Help a Child with Emotional Disabilities Find a New School, STAN. NEWS SERV. (July 20, 2011), 
https://news.stanford.edu/pr/2011/pr-mills-legal-clinic-072011.html [https://perma.cc/S6W4-QJG9] 
(quoting clinical Professor William Koski describing problems clinical students face as “[n]ot the 
kind of problems students learn about in law classes, but the kind of real-life problems they’ll be 
dealing with every day as lawyers”). 
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How exactly should the clinician respond to a specific instance of 
third-party harassment when it occurs despite proactive training? I have 
argued in Part II that the “go to” remedies of reporting the behavior, 
withdrawing from the case, and/or switching out the students are not 
always appropriate, and are not advisable without careful consideration of 
alternative, less drastic options that are less likely to diminish the quality 
of either the representation or the student’s educational experience. 
One way to consider those alternatives is to imagine a matrix of 
variables that can serve as a starting point for assessing the appropriate 
response in a given situation. After all, my aim is not to suggest that the 
solutions here are obvious, or uniform. Instead, they require a recognition 
of the complexity inherent in any clinical law setting where the duties of 
serving the client, teaching the student, and protecting the student collide. 
For example, one could imagine one axis in a decision-making matrix 
to be the identity of the harasser. Is the person who has engaged in the 
offensive conduct the client? A key witness? An unimportant witness? A 
random bystander? A powerful third party such as the presiding judge? A 
powerless third party such as an incarcerated person in the jail? 
A second axis could be the degree of harassment or abuse to which the 
student has been subjected, as experienced by the student. Was it one 
sexist comment? Name-calling? Was it “severe and pervasive”? Was it 
sexual assault? Is the student indifferent to the harassment and eager to 
return? Is the student unsettled but reluctantly willing to return? Or is the 
student traumatized and simply unwilling or unable to return to face 
further harassment? (And, critically, is the clinical supervisor confident 
that the student is comfortable relaying their true feelings, or are they 
telling the supervisor what they think the supervisor wants to hear?) 
A third axis could be the degree to which the student will likely be 
subjected to the harassment in the future. Was the witness one that needs 
not be visited ever again? Or were they one who, as in the opening 
hypothetical, may be a critical part of the case going forward? If the 
harasser is the client, is the client likely to continue acting offensively? Or 
does the team believe the client has been effectively directed not to repeat 
the behavior? 
A final axis could be the nature of the representation in which the clinic 
is engaged. Is this a high-volume practice involving similar cases, in a 
jurisdiction with other service providers, such that a case could be 
transferred to another attorney without any prejudice to the client? Or is it 
a complex, unique, resource-intensive case that would prejudice the client 
or wreak havoc on the clinic’s operation were the clinic to withdraw? Are 
there other cases that can provide the student with similar opportunities 
for learning and professional growth, or not? 
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The constellation of those variables should then inform the clinician’s 
response, based on the clinician’s competing duties to zealously represent 
the clinic’s clients, and to provide the student access to equal education 
under Title IX, from among a menu of possible responses, such as: a firm 
request (or demand) for a cessation of the conduct; pairing the student 
with another student or supervisor for support; counseling the student in 
how to continue with the representation and navigate the offending 
conduct (including altering the setting of future possible encounters in an 
attempt to minimize the exposure of further harassment); threat of 
withdrawal; actual withdrawal; threat of report to the Title IX office; 
actual report to the Title IX office; and other possible responses that may 
be idiosyncratic depending on the situation.183 
Applying the above-described matrix of variables to the hypothetical 
that opened the Article provides one example of how a clinician might 
address a situation in practice. In the hypothetical, the harasser is a key 
witness. The case hinges on the cooperation of the witness whose critical 
information appears to come, inextricably, with sexually harassing 
comments to the female student. The degree of harassment is enough to 
make the student very uncomfortable, at the least. In terms of likelihood 
of exposure to further harassment, the students both believe that the 
witness will continue to harass the student on future visits to his home. 
The female student who wants to become a public defender expresses a 
willingness to return to the witness, but not by herself. Finally, although 
the setting may be a criminal defense clinic with a high volume of similar 
cases, removing the female student from the case would likely deprive her 
of the opportunity to prepare a challenging witness for a sentencing 
hearing, which is one of the skills students seek to develop in this 
particular clinic. 
This application of the matrix of variables does not necessarily 
mechanistically produce a perfect solution, but it does allow the clinician 
to begin ruling out some possible remedies, including those that a 
traditional Title IX approach may counsel. For example, reporting the 
harassment to the law school’s Title IX office seems out of the question. 
The client is blameless, and reporting his brother, a key witness, would 
violate the ethical obligation not to reveal information “related to the 
 
183. Different axes on the matrix carry more weight for different questions. For example, the 
degree of the harassment as experienced by the student may end up being dispositive both with respect 
to Title IX reporting obligations and with respect to how the clinician should handle the situation “in 
house.” For example, most clinicians would agree that where a student feels deeply uncomfortable 
returning to a particular witness, they should not be required to do so, and they should be re-assigned 
equally fulfilling, educational clinical work if at all possible.  
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representation,”184 and would almost certainly result in a loss of the 
witness’s cooperation at sentencing. Removing the female student from 
the case would, as noted above, deprive her of the educational opportunity 
and would do so against her will. And withdrawing from the case is 
fraught for a number of reasons, not the least of which is that it may be 
impossible to do without revealing confidences and would probably 
prejudice the client, whose lawyers would be abandoning him on the eve 
of sentencing. 
Ruling out some of the “go to” remedies eventually allows the clinician 
to narrow in on what might be a productive path forward. Now that the 
students know what to expect, can they be provided with a script, like the 
ones discussed above in the medical context, which is designed to cease 
the offending comments and redirect the witness? Can the students 
role-play the return visit with their clinical supervisor or other students? 
Could the supervisor accompany the student in the next interview? Can 
the clinical class as a whole use the opportunity to discuss the ethical 
issues raised by the situation, and brainstorm approaches for the students 
to get the information they need while staying safe and minimizing 
exposure to further harassment? Might it be possible to have the follow-up 
interview in the clinic office as opposed to the witness’s home? Would 
that, or some other setting, lessen the chances of additional harassment 
and still produce the same outcome for the client? What is the client’s 
relationship with the brother? Could the client impress on the brother the 
importance of cooperating respectfully with the student attorneys in a way 
that others might not be able to? 
The point here is not to suggest one stock answer for any particular 
hypothetical. Rather, by recognizing the many variables that influence 
what response best effectuates the clinician’s competing obligations, it 
becomes possible to envision solutions that protect the student and serve 
the client, while at the same time enriching, rather than detracting from, 
the student’s educational experience. That is the promise of both Title IX 
and the enterprise of clinical education. 
CONCLUSION 
My sexual harassment training quiz did not leave me with any 
satisfactory answer. A student engaged in a counseling session with a 
patient as part of a psychology practicum experiences unwanted sexual 
conduct at the hands of the patient, who is intellectually-disabled. The 
training suggests that the student should not be unilaterally dropped from 
 
184. See Alper, supra note 127, at 4–5, 7, 9 (discussing the nuances of ABA Model Rule 1.6 in the 
context of disclosures on social media of information “related to the representation of the client”). 
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the course, nor should her complaint go ignored and unaddressed. Fair 
enough. But the “correct” response—report the incident to the campus 
Title IX office and take steps to stop the behavior—is too simplistic, and 
risks both depriving the student of an educational opportunity and 
harming the patient’s interests. At the same time, it cannot be that the 
student must continue to subject herself to unwanted sexual conduct in 
service of the greater educational or client-driven mission of the 
clinical enterprise. 
The university’s preferred response raises a number of thorny issues 
that this Article attempts to unpack. The introduction of the matrix for 
addressing instances of sexual harassment that clinical students face is 
meant to animate a point that the recently revised Title IX regulations 
noted, namely the “unique differences of educational environments from 
workplaces and the importance of respecting the unique nature and 
purpose of educational environments.”185 
Federal law interpreting Title IX tends to fluctuate with the 
Administration in power, and as discussed above, many colleges and 
universities have ramped up Title IX reporting requirements in the wake 
of the aggressive enforcement policies of the Obama Administration. 
Where federal law does require inflexible adherence to traditional 
remedial measures, it is in tension with the educational and service 
mission of most law school clinics. To the extent the Title IX mandates of 
colleges and universities surpass what federal law requires, this Article 
should warrant some pause, at least in the kind of instances I discuss here. 
I noted in the Introduction that this Article is in conversation with the 
debate about “safe spaces” on campus. But it is not about the classroom. 
It is about the real world of legal practice on behalf of clients who are 
indigent, in a law school clinic, where the rules of professional 
responsibility and the mission of clinical education in some ways cabin 
(and in other ways expand) the range of acceptable responses to 
unwelcome sexual behavior. 
It raises questions about the choices we make, and the way in which we 
define our role as educators. In one sense, it is a false dichotomy to suggest 
that law faculty must choose between keeping their students safe and 
preparing them for the “real world.” Certainly, law faculty, and medical 
school faculty, and journalism school faculty, can do both. And, in the 
context of clinical legal education, faculty can do both while also serving 
the clients and provide high-quality representation that comports with the 
high ethical standards of the profession. 
 
185. Nondiscrimination on the Basis of Sex in Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal 
Financial Assistance, 85 Fed. Reg. 30,026, 30,037 (May 19, 2020) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. 
pt. 106). 
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But it is also true that navigating the competing values discussed in this 
Article can come with a price. If, in all instances, we elevate the protection 
of the student above the duty to educate the student and serve the client, 
we are both failing in our obligation to provide the zealous representation 
that clinical clients deserve, and we are denying our students an equal 
educational opportunity. Instead, the duty of loyalty to the client 
combined with the educational mandate of a law school clinic (and the 
fundamental principle of Title IX) demands that we teach students how to 
be both safe and zealous in their representation of clients. 
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